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INTRODUCTION 
According to the prevailing wisdom in academic public law, 
constitutional theory is a field that seeks to articulate and evaluate 
abstract accounts of the nature of the United States Constitution. 
Theorists offer those accounts as guides to subsequent judicial 
construction of constitutional provisions.1 As typically conceived, 
therefore, constitutional theory tends to proceed analytically from the 
general to the particular; its animating idea is that correct decisions in 
constitutional cases presuppose theoretical commitments to the 
methodological principles that should guide constitutional 
interpretation and the substantive values such interpretation should 
advance.2 
In its enthusiasm for abstraction, constitutional theory has, at 
times, generated accounts of judicial behavior that are removed from 
the realities of judicial practice.3 Indeed, it may not be an 
overstatement to suggest that a basic disconnect exists between the 
turn to theory in legal academia and the actual practice of 
constitutional adjudication. At the Supreme Court bar, for example, 
the Justices — and thus the appellate advocates who appear before 
them — appear more interested in grappling with the law and facts of 
the case at hand than they are eager to articulate or apply grand 
theories about the “fundamental nature” of the Constitution. 
A few academic commentators share the Court’s point of view and 
have sought to redirect the path of academic constitutional law. 
Robert Post, for example, notes that constitutional theory is associated 
with “certain political philosophies that aspire to systematic analysis 
based on first principles,” and he argues that constitutional theory 
should instead seek “to expose and clarify the principles immanent 
 
1. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. 
REV. 535, 537 (1999) (“[B]y [constitutional theory,] I mean theories about the nature of the 
United States Constitution and how judges should interpret and apply it.”); Richard A. 
Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998) (“Constitutional 
theory, as I shall use the term, is the effort to develop a generally accepted theory to guide 
the interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.”). 
2. See generally Fallon, supra note 1 (identifying the criteria that should inform the 
individual’s selection of “a good constitutional theory” for subsequent application to 
constitutional questions). The title and subject of Professor Fallon’s article evidence the 
highly theoretical bent of contemporary constitutional theorists. 
3. The exploits of Hercules, for example, are well known. See RONALD DWORKIN, 
LAW’S EMPIRE 239-412 (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-130 
(1977). 
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within the practice of constitutional adjudication.”4 Constitutional 
theory, he suggests, ought to be “always, so to speak, within our 
tradition and our history; it [ought to be] parasitic on the very practice 
it seeks to explain.”5 On this conception of the field’s role, 
constitutional theory should endeavor to articulate, order, and assess 
the broader principles latent in the Supreme Court’s decisions, and it 
should do so through relatively inductive analyses — accounts in 
which real constitutional cases and legal doctrines play a prominent 
role in formulating the theory itself. 
If constitutional theory is to turn back to the context in which 
constitutional controversies are resolved — to the extant practice of 
constitutional adjudication — the field must be able to account for a 
basic descriptive reality. The Supreme Court, it would seem 
uncontroversial to suggest, assumes different postures in different 
cases. Sometimes, as in the historic example of Brown v. Board of 
Education,6 the Justices step up and forcefully expound the 
fundamental law regardless of how polarizing an issue may be. At 
other times, as in the controversial case of Naim v. Naim,7 the Court 
steps back, its voice inaudible; the Justices make the pragmatic 
judgment that the time is not right for the Court’s intervention, even 
despite the obvious importance and unconstitutionality of the state 
action at issue. On most occasions, the Justices do speak, and they 
adjust the volume of their pronouncements depending upon a 
multitude of considerations; their opinions fall somewhere along the 
decisional spectrum bounded by Brown and Naim.8 
Viewed within this legal landscape, the position advanced by one 
distinguished constitutional theorist is striking. Cass R. Sunstein of the 
University of Chicago agrees that the field has taken an untoward turn 
to theory: 
 Observers, including academic observers, tend to think that the 
Supreme Court should have some kind of “theory.” But as a general rule, 
those involved in constitutional law tend be cautious about theoretical 
claims. For this reason, much of academic work in constitutional law has 
been out of touch with the actual process of constitutional interpretation, 
 
4. Robert Post, Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review, 86 CAL. L. REV. 
429, 429 (1998). 
5. Id.; see also Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. 
REV. 593 (1999) (rejecting the suggestion that judges and constitutional scholars should 
“choose” constitutional theories that they then use to resolve concrete disputes, and arguing 
instead that theories of constitutional interpretation emerge from context-sensitive 
judgments regarding particular cases). 
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
7. 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (refusing to hear a challenge to Virginia’s antimiscegenation 
statute). 
8. For further discussion of Brown and Naim, see infra notes 270-271, 283, 287-290 and 
accompanying text. 
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especially in the last two decades. The judicial mind naturally gravitates 
away from abstractions and toward close encounters with particular 
cases. Even in constitutional law, judges tend to use abstractions only to 
the extent necessary to resolve a controversy.9 
Professor Sunstein agrees, therefore, that constitutional theory should 
play close attention to the Justices’ actual behavior in deciding cases. 
At the same time, however, Professor Sunstein appears to let his 
own theory — minimalism — unduly color his understanding of what 
the Court has actually decided. An occasional qualification 
notwithstanding, he fails to register that the Rehnquist Court has 
tended to alter its role depending on the circumstances. Instead, 
Professor Sunstein maintains that the current Court does not resolve 
controversial cases broadly and deeply based on a comprehensive 
vision of the Constitution or area of law in question. Rather, he has 
argued in academic writing and in the New York Times that most of 
the current Justices are “minimalists”10 in the time-honored tradition 
of Justice Felix Frankfurter11 and his former law clerk, Professor 
Alexander Bickel.12 Minimalists “say no more than necessary,” 
Professor Sunstein urges, “resolv[ing] the largest issues of the day . . . 
as narrowly as possible,” and requiring “[a]bove all . . . procedures 
that are lawful, proper and fair.”13 
In an earlier book that sets out his theory of judicial minimalism, 
Professor Sunstein describes the practice this way: 
A minimalist court settles the case before it, but it leaves many things 
undecided. It is alert to the existence of reasonable disagreement in a 
 
9. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT xi (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME]. 
10. Id. at 9 (stating that Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer 
“embrace minimalism — usually, not always — for reasons connected with their conception 
of the role of the Supreme Court in American government”); Cass R. Sunstein, Op-Ed, The 
Smallest Court in the Land, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2004, § 4 (Week in Review), at 9 [hereinafter 
Sunstein, The Smallest Court]. In the preface to his book, Professor Sunstein describes 
Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer as minimalists. SUNSTEIN, ONE 
CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at xiii. Most likely, the discrepancy between the assertion in 
the preface and on page 9 is inadvertent, so that Professor Sunstein believes six of the nine 
current Justices are minimalists.  
11. According to Professor Sunstein: 
[Minimalism’s] credo was set out by Justice Felix Frankfurter some 60 years ago, in a case 
involving three men who were detained for 14 hours and questioned over two days before 
confessing to the murder of a federal officer. In reversing their conviction because they were 
deprived of their rights to be brought before judicial authorities, Justice Frankfurter wrote: 
“The history of liberty has largely been the history of the [sic] observance of procedural 
safeguards.” 
Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10 (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 
347 (1943)). 
12. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). 
13. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10. 
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heterogeneous society. It knows that there is much that it does not know; 
it is intensely aware of its own limitations. It seeks to decide cases on 
narrow grounds. It avoids clear rules and final resolutions. Alert to the 
problem of unanticipated consequences, it sees itself as part of a system 
of democratic deliberation; it attempts to promote the democratic ideals 
of participation, deliberation, and responsiveness. It allows continued 
space for democratic reflection from Congress and the states. It wants to 
accommodate new judgments about facts and values. To the extent that 
it can, it seeks to provide rulings that can attract support from people 
with diverse theoretical commitments.14 
Professor Sunstein further explains that “the practice of minimalism 
involves two principal features, narrowness and shallowness.”15 Along 
the dimension of breadth, minimalist Justices endeavor to decide the 
specific case before them rather than lay down broad rules that 
effectively decide a host of distinct, future cases. Along the dimension 
of depth, minimalists try to avoid unnecessary theoretical ascents, 
thereby enabling people who diverge on questions of basic principle to 
come together and agree on judicial resolutions in particular cases.16 
Professor Sunstein’s theory of judicial minimalism has both 
descriptive and prescriptive components. He contends that “[t]he 
current Supreme Court embraces minimalism,”17 and he regards this 
state of affairs as providing cause for celebration. For example, 
Professor Sunstein devotes roughly half of One Case at a Time to 
demonstrating — and approving — the Rehnquist Court’s 
commitment to minimalism in navigating the legal controversies over 
physician-assisted suicide, affirmative action, discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation, same-sex education, and the First 
Amendment and new communications technologies.18 Moreover, he 
asserts approvingly that the Court’s October 2003 Term exemplifies 
his theory of judicial minimalism. He maintains that “minimalism 
emerged triumphant” and “was the defining theme of the court’s most 
eagerly anticipated cases” that Term.19 Moving from purported 
description to prescription, he further submits that, “with its insistent 
focus on procedural safeguards, minimalism has real attractions, 
perhaps above all in a period in which judges are forced to reconcile 
the demands of national security with the commitment to liberty.”20 
Professor Sunstein portrays his descriptive and prescriptive claims as 
 
14. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at ix-x. 
15. Id. at 10. 
16. Id. at 10-11. 
17. Id. at xi. 
18. Id. at 75-205. 
19. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10. 
20. Id. 
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complementary, each prefaced on the existence of a relatively clear 
definition of minimalism that is capable of uncontroversial 
application.21 
Those appearances, this Article submits, are illusory. The analysis 
that follows demonstrates a deep tension between Professor Sunstein’s 
aspiration that minimalism serve as an empirically testable (and 
therefore descriptively accurate) account of the Supreme Court’s 
work, and his ambition that minimalism provide a convincing 
normative theory of judicial review.22 I begin by inquiring whether 
judicial minimalism accurately describes many of the most important 
decisions from the October 2003 Term. In order to investigate that 
question, however, I must give minimalism an operational definition 
that is empirically falsifiable. Part I derives, from among the 
possibilities evident in Professor Sunstein’s descriptions, a definition 
focusing on the narrowness and shallowness of judicial decisions. This 
is the only version of minimalism that does not incorporate criteria so 
vague and contestable as to render the theory nonfalsifiable and thus 
empirically useless. Part II demonstrates that, so understood, the 
theory cannot account for many of the Court’s most significant rulings 
from the October 2003 Term. Part III shows that the version of 
judicial minimalism most susceptible to empirical testing has little 
attraction as a normative account of how the Court should resolve 
constitutional controversies. 
A brief conclusion summarizes the results of the Article’s 
empirical and normative analyses, as well as identifies some 
rehabilitative options potentially left open to judicial minimalism 
going forward. One alternative is to articulate and attempt to test 
more modest descriptive claims about the Supreme Court’s 
decisionmaking. Another is to abandon minimalism’s claim to serve as 
a comprehensive approach to judicial review, and instead to embrace a 
contextually justified apprehension of the valuable lessons of 
prudence that historically have animated constitutional theories 
evoking the work of Alexander Bickel. Those powerful themes are 
present in Professor Sunstein’s work. 
 
21. Lest I be suspected of having set up a straw man, it is important to underscore that 
Professor Sunstein offers judicial minimalism as a descriptive and normative account of the 
Supreme Court’s exercise of judicial review. He does not present minimalism merely as a 
general juridical value, virtue, or lesson such as “gradualism,” “judicial restraint,” or 
“prudence.” 
22. Most of the analysis that follows focuses on the Supreme Court because that is 
where Professor Sunstein directs his theory of judicial minimalism. For discussion of his 
theory’s implications for lower courts, see infra Section III.A and accompanying text. I do 
not mean to suggest that constitutional theory should concentrate its attention almost 
exclusively on the Supreme Court. 
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I. OPERATIONALIZING MINIMALISM 
A. What is Minimalism? 
One cannot evaluate Professor Sunstein’s claim that a majority of 
the current Justices are “minimalists”23 without first understanding 
with precision what he means when he uses that term. Nor can one 
assess minimalism’s value as an approach to constitutional 
adjudication without clearly comprehending what minimalism is. A 
purportedly empirical theory’s usefulness is severely limited if its 
definitional criteria are so inconsistently conceived or radically 
indeterminate that the theory is not falsifiable. This point may seem 
obvious, but “[f]amiliarity breeds inattention,”24 and Professor 
Sunstein is, in fact, notoriously ambiguous about what he means by 
“minimalism.” His theory is conceptually unstable. 
At some points in Professor Sunstein’s exposition, minimalism 
appears to be a theory of the Supreme Court’s institutional position. 
He writes that “the denial of certiorari can be analyzed as a form of 
minimalism.”25 “Perhaps,” he suggests, “the Court wants to receive 
more information, is so divided that it could not resolve the case in 
any event, or is attuned to strategic considerations stemming from the 
likelihood of adverse public reactions. For all these reasons, it may be 
prudent to wait.”26 At other points, however, Professor Sunstein 
presents minimalism as a theory of judicial decisionmaking (that is, 
how the Justices should draft opinions).27 As noted above,28 he writes 
that “the practice of minimalism involves two principal features, 
narrowness and shallowness.”29 
The theory of the Court’s institutional position is most closely 
associated with the scholarship of Alexander Bickel, who focused on 
the Court’s role in deciding or not deciding cases.30 Expressed as an 
 
23. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
24. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
18 (1980). 
25. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 39. 
26. Id. 
27. Slippage in the definition of minimalism is apparent throughout One Case at a Time. 
Compare, e.g., SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 39 (observing that “the 
denial of certiorari can be analyzed as a form of minimalism”), with, e.g., id. at 54 (“If the 
Court may deny certiorari partly in order to take account of considerations of this kind, 
surely it can use minimalism for the same purpose.”). 
28. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16. 
29. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 10. 
30. Professor Bickel viewed himself as negotiating, on the Court’s behalf, the same 
tension between principle and pragmatism that President Lincoln’s struggle with the issue of 
slavery has come to symbolize. BICKEL, supra note 12, at 65-72 (discussing the “Lincolnian 
Tension”). Professor Bickel presented the passive virtues not only to make judicial review 
safe for majoritarianism, but also as a shield to preserve the Court’s finite institutional 
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institutional account, minimalism appears to be a generalization of the 
Bickelian theory of the passive virtues, addressing not only the 
question “when” the Court should decide certain controversial issues, 
but also the question “how.” Indeed, Professor Sunstein writes that 
“[i]nsofar as the minimalist judge seeks to promote democratic goals 
while recognizing social pluralism, the minimalist project is easily 
linked with the idea of ‘passive virtues,’ as discussed by Alexander 
Bickel.”31 
This spacious account of judicial minimalism evidences the 
instability of Professor Sunstein’s conception of the theory. Including 
certiorari denials in the definition of minimalism creates an anomaly, 
which could be called the paradox of certiorari: almost any Supreme 
Court decision cannot be minimalist in simple virtue of the fact that 
the Court granted certiorari rather than denying it.32 Professor 
Sunstein certainly does not mean to compel that conclusion, for then 
his entire discussion of the benefits of narrowness and shallowness 
would be beside the point. But logically, his advocacy of narrow and 
shallow decisions presupposes a different definition of minimalism 
than does his endorsement of the passive virtues. 
Insofar as minimalism is conceived as a theory of the Court’s 
institutional position, moreover, a disconnect exists between Professor 
Sunstein’s aggressive descriptive claim that the Court is minimalist and 
the means he employs to validate the assertion. Specifically, he largely 
ignores the Court’s certiorari practice, instead concentrating almost all 
his attention on about one percent of the Court’s docket — namely, 
the eighty or ninety (out of 8,000) cases each Term in which the 
Justices grant certiorari.33 His discussion of certiorari denials and the 
Court’s certiorari practice more generally, canvassed immediately 
above, consumes only a few pages of One Case at a Time. 
Professor Sunstein’s approach raises basic questions about 
minimalism’s coherence as an account of the Court’s work. What 
sense does it make to discuss whether the Justices are minimalists 
without considering the overwhelming majority of instances in which 
 
capital in the face of intense political and moral disagreements in American society. Id. at 
111-98. 
31.  SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 39. See also id. at 267, n. 5. 
32. The Court can choose to deny certiorari almost always. Congress still places a few 
categories of cases within the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction — for example, the 
campaign finance cases from the October 2003 Term. See infra text accompanying notes 101-
112. 
33. In a typical Term these days, about 8,000 certiorari petitions are filed and around 
one percent of them are granted. In the October 2003 Term, for example, 1,722 paid cases 
and 6,092 in forma pauperis cases were docketed, for a total of 7,814. Only ninety-one cases, 
some of which were consolidated, were argued, submitted, and decided. See Clerk’s Office, 
Supreme Court of the United States, Statistical Sheet No. 28 (June 30, 2004) (on file with 
author). 
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minimalism could potentially be employed simply by declining to 
consider cases — that is, through denials of certiorari? Similarly, in 
cases in which the Court grants certiorari, it is not obvious why the 
purposes of judicial minimalism are implicated in discussions of the 
narrowness and shallowness of a given decision but not in the 
antecedent question whether (or how) the Court should have granted 
certiorari in the first place.34 In other words, Professor Sunstein’s 
concentration on the Justices’ written opinions ignores a crucial 
dimension of the Supreme Court’s activity, one that should inform 
debates about the existence of judicial minimalism insofar as the 
theory is proffered as a descriptively accurate account of the Court’s 
institutional position. 
If one conceives judicial minimalism not as a theory of the Court’s 
institutional position, but instead as an account of judicial 
decisionmaking once certiorari has been granted, the theory’s 
instability endures. Sometimes, minimalism is presented as a theory of 
opinion writing that promotes narrow and shallow decisions, rulings 
from which certain goods are supposed to flow — namely, 
minimization of decision and error costs, enhanced democratic 
deliberation, overlapping consensus, and avoidance of deep 
theorizing.35 At other times, however, minimalism seems to be a 
substantive theory of decisionmaking, one in which minimizing costs 
in the tradition of law and economics (broadly conceived),36 
implementing the virtues of democratic self-governance in the manner 
of modern republican theory,37 and achieving overlapping consensus 
following the inspiration of John Rawls38 constitute the 
decisionmaking criteria themselves.39 And on still other occasions, 
 
34. See, e.g., infra notes 181-182 and accompanying text (observing that the Supreme 
Court sometimes rewrites the questions presented as articulated by the parties or chooses to 
review only certain questions presented). 
35. See infra Part III (analyzing the various substantive conceptions noted in the text). 
To be clear, conceiving minimalism as promoting narrow and shallow decisions does not 
entail viewing the attributes of narrowness and shallowness as goods in themselves; rather, 
those criteria for decisionmaking constitute means to the end of promoting various other 
goods, such as democratic deliberation. On any of its conceptions, minimalism is about 
values, not craft-related questions that are pursued for their own sake. 
36.  SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 46 (“Note that we can find such 
notions useful without thinking that it is necessary or helpful to understand the idea of 
‘costs’ in a fully economistic manner, as if the various consequences of decisions can be 
monetized, or aligned along a single metric.”). 
37. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 
(1988). 
38. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). See infra Section III.C 
for a discussion of Professor Sunstein’s use of Rawlsian political philosophy. 
39. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 13-14 (capturing Professor Sunstein’s 
vacillations between different conceptions of minimalism). 
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minimalism appears to be a substantive theory of rights, one that 
stresses the importance of strong procedural protections.40 
These are all different accounts of minimalism, and how they relate 
to one another theoretically is not clear in Professor Sunstein’s work. 
He seems to shift from one to another without explanation, and the 
resulting blurriness generates confusion about what the theory of 
judicial minimalism is.41 For example, it would seem uncontroversial 
that decisions best promoting and protecting democratic deliberation, 
such as New York Times v. Sullivan,42 need not be either narrow or 
shallow. The same can be said of decisions that protect judicial 
procedural rights, such as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.43 Indeed, both types of 
decisions are at war with the notion of minimalism as a theory of 
judicial modesty and reservation because in any particular 
circumstance they can counsel dramatic results. So where exactly does 
minimalism put its chips? The answer is unclear, because Professor 
Sunstein situates the normative prong of his theory ambiguously 
between a theory of decisionmaking and a substantive theory of rights. 
And the situation is made analytically muddier because more than one 
theory of decisionmaking appears to be in play. 
All these interpretations of judicial minimalism are interesting, and 
it is worth pausing to consider what one would have to believe 
jurisprudentially to think any of them made sense. Implicitly, 
minimalism rejects a hard-edged formalism in which there exists one 
“right” answer to a legal question, and it also denies the existence of a 
regime characterized by such radical divergence that practitioners 
cannot agree on what counts as the minimalist interpretation of a case. 
Instead, judicial minimalism presupposes the existence of a relatively 
stable community of meaning, one that, by and large, can come to a 
rough consensus on which way of deciding a case is the minimalist 
option.44 
 
40. See, e.g., supra note 11. 
41. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 13 (switching from a focus on narrow and 
shallow decisions to an emphasis on procedural safeguards). 
42. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that freedom of speech and press bars a civil libel 
judgment for criticism of the official conduct of public officials, unless the plaintiff shows 
malice by clear and convincing evidence). 
43. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (holding in part that due process requires the government to 
give a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant a meaningful opportunity to 
contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker). For a detailed 
discussion of Hamdi, see infra notes 166-169, 208-222, 282-290 and accompanying text. 
44. For work clarifying the idea of communities of shared meaning in law, see, for 
example, ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 139-60 (1990) and Richard A. 
Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the 
Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 186-94 (1986-87). For relevant philosophical 
background, see generally 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE 
ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (T. McCarthy trans., 1984), and 
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Are these jurisprudential assumptions credible? On some level and 
to some extent, they are. For example, no one in the speech 
community of contemporary constitutional lawyers would suggest that 
a narrower option reasonably available to the Supreme Court in a 
given case would be to limit its holding to individuals with the same 
hair color as the prevailing party. We can all agree that hair color is 
completely irrelevant. Of course, that example concerns only the 
narrowness/shallowness conception of minimalism, and even on that 
interpretation of the theory, it would seem to leave plenty of room for 
intense disagreement about the minimalist disposition of a case. 
The notion of a stable community of meaning seems incredible 
with respect to the other interpretations of judicial minimalism that 
are on the table. A Bickelian understanding — call it “prudentialism” 
— is impossible to test because the Court almost never explains why at 
least six Justices voted to deny certiorari.45 More importantly, even if 
explanations were offered, the question whether a given certiorari 
denial was prudentialist would itself be endlessly debatable. 
Reasonable people inevitably will disagree about whether the Court 
should acquire “more information” before intervening, whether the 
country is ready for a particular decision, and whether a legal question 
is of such urgency and moment that the Court should decide it 
regardless of “strategic considerations stemming from the likelihood 
of adverse public reactions.”46  
Similarly, viewing democratic deliberation, overlapping consensus, 
etc., as the criteria for decisionmaking renders effectively impossible 
the formation of a consensus on the minimalist interpretation of a 
case. Reasonable people inevitably will disagree about what sorts of 
judicial decisions are required to promote those goals. The point here 
is not that minimalism cannot be falsified as a technical matter, but 
rather that the theory no longer has an operational definition that can 
actually be tested. Such a conception of minimalism, in other words, is 
not empirical but normative, because the question of what will serve 
various substantive values is always normatively contestable. 
Democracy promotion, for example, is often in the eye of the 
beholder. The same reasonable yet irreconcilable disagreement 
endures when minimalism is conceived as a substantive theory of 
rights. 
We are left, therefore, with the view of minimalism that identifies 
the narrowness and shallowness of an opinion as the criteria for 
 
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 
1958). 
45. The affirmative votes of four Justices are required for the Court to grant a petition 
for a writ of certiorari. 
46  SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 39. 
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decision. Professor Sunstein stresses this approach, writing that “the 
practice of minimalism involves two principal features, narrowness 
and shallowness.”47 While this conception has its problems, they are 
probably not as intractable as those associated with the other 
interpretations of minimalism canvassed above.48 That is because there 
likely exists greater agreement within the speech community of 
contemporary constitutional lawyers regarding what constitutes the 
narrowest and shallowest resolution of a case than there is regarding 
which decision is most conducive to democratic deliberation, 
overlapping consensus, etc. Regardless of whether an analysis of 
breadth and depth is ultimately credible, in other words, it seems less 
incredible than the alternatives, and it may be the best we can do in a 
post-Realist world. 
Insofar as minimalism can be given an operational definition that is 
capable of disconfirmation, Professor Sunstein’s descriptive claim that 
the Supreme Court embraces judicial minimalism provides an 
interesting empirical proposition. In the following test of his assertion, 
I investigate an account of minimalism that focuses on judicial opinion 
writing and that enables minimalism to be both a normative and 
empirical theory. In the next section, I give operational meaning to 
minimalism by defining it as a theory of judicial decisionmaking that 
promotes narrow and shallow opinions because of various goods that 
are alleged to flow from such rulings.49 
 
47. Id. at 10. 
48. There is truth — but also overstatement — in Jeffrey Rosen’s assertion that 
“[w]hether a decision is characterized as narrow or shallow, or deep or broad, seems entirely 
in the eye of the beholder. . . . The indeterminacy of Sunstein’s categories calls their broader 
utility into question.” Jeffrey R. Rosen, The Age of Mixed Results, NEW REPUBLIC, June 28, 
1999, at 43-44. Among modern practitioners, moreover, there likely exists less agreement 
regarding whether a case was decided “narrowly” than there is concerning whether it was 
decided “as narrowly as reasonably possible.” The question whether a holding is narrow is 
inescapably relative. By contrast, the question whether a case was decided as narrowly as 
reasonably possible invites a more tractable debate over the reasonableness of further 
narrowing. 
49. I do not mean to suggest that empirical falsifiability is a necessary condition of a 
satisfactory constitutional theory. On the contrary, there is a central place for normative 
legal theory that is not falsifiable. Indeed, much constitutional jurisprudence involves 
training one’s attention on important precedents and gleaning the lessons of principle and 
prudence they offer. Positivists in the social sciences take exception to such an approach 
because it does not permit prediction and its lessons are not falsifiable. But that does not 
mean nonfalsifiable normative theory is not valuable, even necessary, given the nature of the 
enterprise of understanding the practice of constitutional adjudication. This Article focuses 
in part on the issue of empirical verification because Professor Sunstein makes aggressive 
descriptive claims. 
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B. A (Relatively) Falsifiable Definition of Minimalism 
In One Case at a Time, Professor Sunstein defines the phrase 
“decisional minimalism,” which he uses interchangeably with the 
words “judicial minimalism” and “minimalism,” as “the phenomenon 
of saying no more than necessary to justify an outcome, and leaving as 
much as possible undecided.”50 Minimalists “say no more than 
necessary,” Professor Sunstein has reiterated, “resolv[ing] the largest 
issues of the day . . . as narrowly as possible,” and requiring “[a]bove 
all . . . procedures that are lawful, proper and fair.”51 Practitioners of 
judicial minimalism, he submits, decide the case before them, but they 
resolve the action as narrowly and shallowly as possible. 
According to this operational definition, therefore, minimalism is 
not conceived merely as leaving questions undecided. If that were the 
definition, then every case would be minimalist in the trivial sense that 
reflects the nature of appellate litigation: some issues are presented 
and others are not. In other words, it is not helpful to suggest that a 
Supreme Court decision is minimalist if it leaves questions 
unanswered because all cases leave some questions open. Nor does it 
appear useful to submit that a decision is minimalist if it is decided on 
jurisdictional grounds rather than on the merits. Jurisdictional rulings 
can be very broad in both their scope and impact.52 Finally, it seems a 
deviation from the operational definition of minimalism to identify a 
holding as minimalist just because the Court decides the only question 
before it, leaving other issues unresolved. In that circumstance, it 
would be not only misleading, but also incorrect, to say that the Court 
resolved the case “as narrowly as possible.” With only one question 
before the Court, it could just as readily be said that the Justices 
disposed of the matter as broadly as possible.53 
Rather, to be minimalist according to the operational definition, a 
decision must have two components: it must (a) result from the 
(apparently) intentional choice by a majority of the Justices (b) to 
decide a case on the narrowest and shallowest grounds reasonably 
open to them, even though broader and deeper rationale(s) were 
reasonably available. To say the same thing a slightly different way, a 
 
50. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 3-4. 
51. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10. 
52. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (holding that a plaintiff in 
a civil rights action who had been subjected to a chokehold by the police after a routine 
traffic stop lacked standing to seek injunctive relief that would have forbidden future use of 
chokeholds because he could not show he was likely to be subjected to them again). 
53. It also would be inaccurate to describe as minimalist a decision whose limited scope 
is attributable to the lack of a majority opinion. In that scenario, the opinion’s narrowness 
and shallowness seem more a function of necessity than choice. In any event, a fractured 
Court is not what Professor Sunstein has in mind in describing and defending minimalism. If 
it were, he would have underscored that point in One Case at a Time. 
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decision is minimalist if and only if at least five Justices had reasonably 
available a broader and deeper result, but consciously (as best one can 
tell) decided the case as narrowly and shallowly as reasonably 
possible.54 It follows from this definition that a decision cannot be 
minimalist if no broader and deeper options were reasonably available 
to the Court. And when broader and deeper options were reasonably 
available, a decision still is not minimalist if narrower and shallower 
alternatives were reasonably available as well.55 If no broader and 
deeper option was reasonably open to the Court, therefore, Professor 
Sunstein cannot establish that a given decision is minimalist. If 
narrower and shallower alternatives were reasonably available to the 
Justices, moreover, it can be affirmatively shown that a decision is not 
minimalist.56 
To be clear, these demanding requirements are not the proximate 
result of an uncharitable reading of Professor Sunstein’s work. On the 
contrary, they are logical entailments of Professor Sunstein’s own 
aggressive and provocative submissions that the Rehnquist Court is 
minimalist and minimalists decide cases as narrowly and shallowly as 
possible.57 One key question this inquiry will investigate is the extent 
 
54. It would be possible to define minimalism without requiring that it entail a conscious 
choice — that is, the practice could be defined as rendering the narrowest and shallowest 
decision possible when broader and deeper alternatives are available. Minimalism would 
then be a way of categorizing opinions. But that approach does not accurately reflect 
Professor Sunstein’s argument. He is focusing on minimalism as an option that courts do and 
should make. This understanding reflects minimalism as a conscious choice. 
55. The repeated references to reasonableness in the text seek to exclude exercises in 
further narrowing that most, if not all, members of the speech community of contemporary 
constitutional lawyers would regard as unavailable — for example, limiting the holding of a 
case to persons with the hair color of the prevailing party. 
56. It might be profitable to examine more deeply the adequacy of this definition of 
judicial minimalism. For example, the attribute of shallowness may not be as important as 
that of narrowness in properly conceiving minimalism; the issue of shallowness may have 
more to do with the extent of one’s agreement with a court’s reasoning than with the optimal 
level of theoretical depth. Indeed, Professor Sunstein may have implicitly, if unwittingly, 
acknowledged that narrowness is more important than shallowness in identifying minimalist 
decisionmaking. He sometimes drops shallowness as a criterion in his description of 
minimalism. See supra text accompanying note 13. Moreover, he types Chief Justice 
Rehnquist as more nonminimalist than minimalist, see SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, 
supra note 9, at xiii, yet the Chief Justice’s opinions are characteristically shallow in the 
sense that their underlying rationales are not readily available. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 124 
S. Ct. 1307 (2004); infra notes 126-134 and accompanying text (discussing Locke v. Davey); 
see also infra note 162 and accompanying text (identifying another instance in which the 
Chief Justice provides no explanation for a nonobvious conclusion). In any event, the 
interesting question of narrowness versus shallowness is beyond the scope of this inquiry. I 
am content to stick with what I perceive to be the most operational understanding of 
minimalism in Professor Sunstein’s work, and to investigate the phenomenon’s positive and 
normative power. 
57. See, e.g., text accompanying note 13; see also SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra 
note 9, at 3-4 (“Let us describe the phenomenon of saying no more than necessary to justify 
an outcome, and leaving as much as possible undecided, as ‘decisional minimalism.’”) 
(emphases added). 
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to which Professor Sunstein has seriously overclaimed. Even if he has, 
however, it is worth underscoring that a respectable minimalism of 
relative narrowness and shallowness, both empirically and 
normatively, may still be possible. I will return to that issue in the 
Conclusion of this Article. 
Note one implication of the notion of deciding a case as narrowly 
and shallowly as reasonably possible. The minimalist inquiry takes as 
it finds them the Court’s dispositions of cases — that is, the majority’s 
decision whether to affirm or reverse the judgment of the court below. 
Minimalism addresses only how those decisions are crafted in terms of 
narrowness and shallowness. A distinct way of proceeding would be to 
direct the Justices to begin with the goal of narrowness and 
shallowness and then to choose dispositions that are the least broad 
and deep. Although it is possible to read Professor Sunstein both 
ways, the operational definition reflects the former understanding 
because it is doubtful Professor Sunstein means to require the Justices 
not to act on their considered constitutional judgments about who 
should win and who should lose a given case. In the empirical analysis 
that follows, therefore, it is no argument against minimalism that the 
dissent’s approach was narrower and shallower than the majority’s. 
Another dimension of the operational definition of minimalism is 
worth underscoring from the start: the reasons motivating a decision 
are not relevant in assessing whether a decision is minimalist. Reasons 
for action, therefore, will not play a prominent role in the following 
empirical analysis of Rehnquist Court decisionmaking. What matters 
to the operational view of minimalism is the degree of narrowness and 
shallowness that the Justices chose relative to the available 
alternatives, not the question why the Court decided a case in a 
particular way. The reason could be that the Justices, like Professor 
Sunstein, care about deliberative democracy and negotiating deep 
moral disagreements. But the reason could also be the need to count 
to five and form a Court. Without some story to the effect that 
ideological and methodological differences within the Court faithfully 
reflect the moral and cultural diversity across American society as a 
whole, compromising on principle to get along with one’s colleagues 
would seem to have little to do with the democratic values minimalism 
seeks to promote. 
Accordingly, the presence of a minimalist opinion provides no 
indication that the Justices share the theory’s democratic project. I 
emphasize this point for a reason. In stating that “[t]he current 
Supreme Court embraces minimalism,”58 Professor Sunstein appears 
to suggest not only that the Justices render the narrowest and 
shallowest decisions reasonably possible, but also that they are 
 
58. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at xi. 
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motivated by minimalist substantive values.59 That motivational 
assertion is largely nonfalsifiable. The Court does not reveal its 
internal deliberations, nor is a minimalist motivation evident on the 
face of most opinions. Only years from the time a decision comes 
down, when the private papers of then-current Justices are made 
public, may scholars and other Court watchers have any chance of 
learning as a general matter whether the Justices who joined 
minimalist opinions were motivated by minimalism.60 
One final point about the operational conception of minimalism is 
worth stressing before turning to the cases. One cannot determine 
whether a judicial decision is minimalist by assessing its real-world 
effects. While minimalist opinions may tend to have less impact than 
nonminimalist decisions as a general matter, that need not always be 
the case. Narrow and shallow decisions can have huge impacts, and 
broad and deep decisions can cause relatively modest effects. Baker v. 
Carr held only that malapportionment challenges are justiciable, but 
the legal and social consequences were enormous.61 And the Court’s 
more recent anticommandeering decisions were relatively broad and 
deep, but the effects of that principle have been quite modest.62 The 
narrowness/shallowness inquiry is analytically distinct from an 
investigation of social consequences. 
II. THE REHNQUIST COURT’S RECENT RECORD 
With the operational definition of minimalism in hand, it is now 
possible to evaluate Professor Sunstein’s provocative descriptive claim 
that the current Court embraces his theory. In this regard, one 
important issue to consider is the consistency between his definition of 
minimalism and the decisions he identifies as minimalist. Another 
significant question, with which I begin, is the optimal sample size 
from which to draw general conclusions about the jurisprudential 
nature of this Court’s work. 
 
59. See id. at 9 (asserting that Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer “have chosen to be minimalist for reasons that are, broadly speaking, of the sort I will 
be discussing here” (emphasis added)). 
60. The Justices’ academic writings and public addresses might provide general evidence 
of a minimalist judicial philosophy. To my knowledge, however, none of them has expressed 
a minimalist motivation in such settings. 
61. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
62. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress may not 
“commandeer” local sheriffs by requiring them to perform background checks on would-be 
handgun purchasers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that a federal 
statute requiring states either to regulate radioactive waste or to take title to the waste 
constitutes unconstitutional compulsion and commandeering of the states’ governmental 
capacity). 
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In considering the descriptive accuracy of Professor Sunstein’s 
claim that the Rehnquist Court embraces minimalism, a 
methodological question that immediately arises is how best to 
proceed. If one takes as the proper time frame a roughly twenty-year 
period, the sheer number of decisions involved renders detailed 
analysis difficult to conduct. Moreover, one runs the risk of being 
selective in choosing which cases to analyze. It appears likely that a 
number of decisions from the past two decades are minimalist, and 
that a number are not. 
In light of those difficulties, one appropriate way to assess a 
theorist’s descriptive thesis is to focus on a sufficiently short time 
period such that the evaluative problem is rendered both analytically 
tractable and susceptible to evenhanded analysis. Regarding Professor 
Sunstein’s theory in particular, it seems appropriate to examine closely 
the constitutional cases from the Court’s October 2003 Term because 
he himself has implied that the Justices’ work during that year 
validates his theory.63 Below I analyze the decisions he discusses from 
that Term after first applying the operational definition of minimalism 
to several significant holdings he overlooks.64 
A. Decisions Overlooked 
1. Blakely and Crawford 
Professor Sunstein makes no mention of the Court’s jaw-dropping 
holding in Blakely v. Washington.65 Although overshadowed by more 
high-profile cases, Blakely may end up being the year’s most 
momentous decision in terms of concrete human consequences. The 
Court there struck down a state sentencing-guidelines regime on 
grounds that jeopardized the constitutionality of numerous other state 
sentencing systems and led to the partial invalidation — and 
fundamental reshaping — of the United States Sentencing 
 
63. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10. 
64. To be clear, I focus on the constitutional cases from the October 2003 Term, 
including those that were not ultimately decided on constitutional grounds. I do not analyze 
the several cases in which the Court decided important questions of federal statutory 
interpretation. Nor do I discuss most of the criminal procedure decisions. Those regrettable 
omissions were necessary to keep this Article’s length manageable. For a more 
comprehensive overview of the term, see The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Leading Cases, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 248, 248-496 (2004) [hereinafter Leading Cases]. 
65. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); see, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Blakely’s Federal Aftermath, 16 
FED. SENTENCING REP. 333, 333 (2004) (“The media are sometimes slow to recognize 
landmark Supreme Court decisions. Even Professor Cass Sunstein praised the current 
Justices as ‘minimalists’ who hew to judicial restraint, overlooking the Court’s most earth-
shaking decision last Term.”). Justice Breyer relied on Professor Bibas’s work in his Blakely 
dissent. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2553, 2556-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Stephanos 
Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 
YALE L.J. 1097, 1100-01 (2001)). 
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Guidelines.66 Specifically, the Court in Blakely held that petitioner 
Ralph Howard Blakely’s sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right 
to trial by jury because not every fact supporting the sentence was 
admitted by him or found by a jury.67 Using a common practice, the 
judge ratcheted up Blakely’s sentence from 53 months to 90 months 
after finding that he had acted with “deliberate cruelty,” a statutory 
ground for departing upward from the standard sentencing range.68 
The result was that two decades of sentencing reform and tens of 
thousands of criminal sentences were put in jeopardy, which is why 
lawyers and judges around the country scrambled to understand the 
decision’s breadth and to choose a sensible response. Justice 
O’Connor, who does not often exaggerate for rhetorical effect, wrote 
in dissent that “the practical consequences of today’s decision may be 
disastrous.”69 The Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits struck down the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in light of 
Blakely,70 and the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits reaffirmed the Guidelines’ validity.71 With the situation in the 
lower courts still very much in flux,72 the Supreme Court, at the urgent 
request of then-Acting Solicitor General Paul D. Clement during the 
 
66. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (holding that the Sixth 
Amendment as interpreted in Blakely applies to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and that 
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 must be modified so as to render the Guidelines 
effectively advisory, requiring a sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges but 
permitting it to tailor the sentence in view of other statutory concerns). 
67. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536-43. 
68. Id. at 2535. 
69. Id. at 2544. 
70. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, No. 04-104 (Aug. 
2, 2004); United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2004). 
71. United States v. Warren, 120 Fed. Appx. 257 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Mincey, 380 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam); United States v. Hammoud, 378 F.3d 426 
(4th Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Koch, 383 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States v. Reese, 382 F.3d 1308 
(11th Cir. 2004). 
72. Legal blogs on the Internet reported the judicial action blow by blow. See, e.g., 
Howard J. Bashman, How Appealing, at http://legalaffairs.org/howappealing (visited 
throughout Summer 2004); Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Law and Policy, at 
http://sentencing.typepad.com. Dahlia Lithwick, in her inimitable way, observed: 
 For the first time in recent memory, the wheels of justice are turning faster than the news 
cycle. The fallout from the term’s sleeper case, Blakely v. Washington, grows more dramatic 
by the hour. And the best image I can conjure to describe the situation involves all the 
federal court judges in America racing around with plastic bags, trying madly to dispose of 
the Supreme Court’s droppings. 
Dahlia Lithwick, No-Good Lazy Justices: After the Supreme Court’s sentencing case, the sky 
is falling. Hooray!, SLATE, July 15, 2004, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2103909. I had to revise 
the paragraph in the text describing the developments in the circuits several times, as each 
new decision rendered the previous day’s summary out of date. 
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Court’s Summer 2004 recess,73 granted certiorari in two cases to 
resolve the circuit split and restore uniformity to federal criminal 
sentencing law.74 The Court heard oral argument on Monday, October 
4, the first day of the new Term, in a very rare afternoon session.75 
Booker and Fanfan came down on January 12, 2005. In an unusual 
decision, the Court issued two separate majority opinions. The first 
concluded that the current approach to applying the Sentencing 
Guidelines was unconstitutional, and the second prescribed the 
remedy for this constitutional problem. Justice Stevens, joined by 
Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, held that Blakely 
applies to the Sentencing Guidelines. Justice Stevens stressed that the 
Guidelines compelled the judge to impose a sentence greater than that 
which would be based on the jury’s verdict; he concluded that this 
requirement conflicts with Blakely’s holding that any factor (other 
than the fact of a prior conviction) leading to a sentence greater than 
that which would be imposed based on the jury’s verdict must be 
proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.76 Regarding the 
appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation, however, Justice 
Breyer wrote for the Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg.77 Justice Breyer 
concluded that the proper remedy, in light of the congressional intent 
underlying the Sentencing Reform Act, was to make the Guidelines 
advisory rather than mandatory — that the Guidelines’ mandatory 
nature rendered them unconstitutional.78 He concluded that federal 
courts of appeals should review sentences to determine whether they 
are reasonable.79 
Because Blakely triggered this extraordinary series of events, the 
notion that it was a minimalist decision may seem counterintuitive. 
 
73. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, October Term 2004 
Briefs Petitions and Replies, at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2004/2pet/7pet/2004-
0104.pet.aa.html, http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2004/2pet/7pet/2004-0105.pet.aa.html (last 
visited August 3, 2004). 
74. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 11 
(2004); Fanfan v. United States, No. 03-47, 2004 WL 1723114 (D. Me. Jun 28, 2004), cert. 
granted before judgment, 125 S. Ct. 11 (2004). 
75. Supreme Court of the United States, Argument Calendar: October Term 2004, at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_calendars/monthlyargumentcaloc
tober2004.pdf (last visited Aug. 3, 2004). 
76. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 748-52 (2005). 
77. In other words, Justice Ginsburg joined the four dissenters to Justice Stevens’ 
opinion — the dissenters in Blakely — on the issue of the appropriate remedy. 
78. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757-69. Justice Breyer expressly disagreed with the dissent’s 
view that the jury should find the requisite facts for greater sentences under the Guidelines. 
Justice Breyer perceived no basis for the Court’s interjecting the jury into the sentencing 
system created by Congress under the Sentencing Reform Act. Id. 
79. Id. at 765-67. 
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Yet it is worth recalling that minimalist decisions may have a 
significant real-world impact.80 It might be technically accurate, 
therefore, to describe the Court’s ruling in Blakely as minimalist.81 A 
defender of judicial minimalism who turned her attention to Blakely 
might suggest that the decision represents minimalism par excellence. 
After all, the Court expressly declined to decide the validity of the 
Federal Guidelines,82 instead choosing to proceed “one case at a 
time.”83 
Such a defender of minimalism, however, cannot rely on the 
Federal Guidelines question left open in Blakely to show that broader 
and deeper options were reasonably available to the Court. The 
Justices could not have decided Blakely more broadly and deeply for 
the simple reason that the constitutionality of the Guidelines was not 
before the Court. The cold, hard reality of judicial review is that the 
Justices can — in the sense of raw power to act — say whatever they 
want. But that cannot be the criterion for determining whether a 
decision is minimalist if one wants to avoid the trivial conclusion that 
every judicial decision lacks breadth in this sense. Rather, the relevant 
question is whether the Court reasonably could have decided the 
Guidelines issue in Blakely. I do not see how it could have.84 
 
80. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62. 
81. Indeed, looking back now in the wake of Blakely and Booker, Jeffrey Rosen was 
prescient in his assessment of One Case at a Time: 
 If the Supreme Court were the only court in the nation, it might be able to embrace a 
highly personalized, “the law is what we say it is” jurisprudence, without worrying about 
giving very clear reasons for why it is doing so, and without tipping its hand about how it is 
likely to decide similar cases in the future. In the American system, however, the Supreme 
Court sits at the top of a pyramid of inferior federal courts, all of which are bound to apply 
its decisions uniformly throughout the nation. And lower courts, when faced with a narrow, 
shallow Supreme Court decision of the kind that Sunstein praises, may literally be at a loss 
about what the opinion means. This is more likely to promote chaos than reasoned 
deliberation. 
Rosen, supra note 48, at 45. 
82. Justice Scalia authored this terse, poker-faced statement for the Court: “The Federal 
Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opinion on them.” Blakely v. Washington, 
124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 n.9 (2004). Justice Scalia declined to engage Justice Breyer’s strong 
disagreement with the Court’s approach: 
 Ordinarily, this Court simply waits for cases to arise in which it can answer such questions. 
But this case affects tens of thousands of criminal prosecutions, including federal 
prosecutions. Federal prosecutors will proceed with those prosecutions subject to the risk 
that all defendants in those cases will have to be sentenced, perhaps tried, anew. Given this 
consequence and the need for certainty, I would not proceed further piecemeal; rather, I 
would call for further argument on the ramifications of the concerns I have raised. But that 
is not the Court’s view. 
Id. at 2562 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
83. Lithwick, for example, praised the Blakely decision because the Court “did precisely 
what everyone keeps asking courts to do and showed impressive restraint.” Lithwick, supra 
note 72. 
84. This is not to suggest that the Court had no alternative but to proceed in the way it 
did. The Court could have granted certiorari in Blakely along with one of the many petitions 
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The Court, moreover, reasonably could have resolved Blakely 
more narrowly and shallowly than it did. The part of the opinion that 
has received the most attention is Justice Scalia’s explanation of why 
the maximum sentence Blakely could have received was 53 months, 
not 90: 
Our precedents make clear . . . that the “statutory maximum” for 
Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely 
on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 
defendant. In other words, the relevant “statutory maximum” is not the 
maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but 
the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. When a 
judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the 
jury has not found all the facts “which the law makes essential to the 
punishment,” and the judge exceeds his proper authority. 
 The judge in this case could not have imposed the exceptional 90-
month sentence solely on the basis of the facts admitted in the guilty 
plea. . . . Had the judge imposed the 90-month sentence solely on the 
basis of the plea, he would have been reversed. The “maximum 
sentence” is no more 10 years here than it was 20 years in Apprendi 
(because that is what the judge could have imposed upon finding a hate 
crime) or death in Ring (because that is what the judge could have 
imposed upon finding an aggravator).85 
In order to resolve the case, the Court did not need to distinguish 
between judicial and jury fact findings at such a general level of 
abstraction. Instead, the Justices could have rendered a more 
factbound decision, that is, one limited to judicial findings similar to 
that of “deliberate cruelty” at issue in the case. Indeed, in light of the 
demanding mens rea requirement implicit in the word “deliberate,” 
the particular factual determination at issue in Blakely was indicative 
of a separate crime. The Court could have held only that the State’s 
scheme was unconstitutional as far as such facts are concerned. 
The intuition behind the Court’s broad holdings in Apprendi v. 
New Jersey86 and Blakely appears to be that it is unconstitutional to 
convict someone of one crime and then to sentence him to a different, 
more serious crime.87 Justice Scalia is right that it can be difficult to 
 
seeking to challenge the Federal Guidelines that routinely are pending before the Court; the 
Justices then could have considered both questions together. Alternatively, the Court could 
have delayed ruling in Blakely and granted certiorari in a Federal Guidelines case once the 
implications of the Court’s holding in Blakely had become clearer to the Justices. The Court 
also could have followed Justice Breyer’s advice. See supra note 82. 
85. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537-38 (2004) (citations and footnote omitted). 
86. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
87. I credit Erwin Chemerinsky with having articulated that intuitive understanding of 
Apprendi and Blakely’s essential meaning. 
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sort out the point at which the “tail” begins to “wag” the “dog.”88 But 
he cannot reasonably deny that some cases are easier than others in 
this regard. Nor can he establish that the Court was somehow required 
to decide all such cases arising under Washington law at once. 
The minimalist approach I suggest above, it could be argued, might 
have required the Court to make distinctions without an ultimately 
persuasive difference after several more cases were litigated at the 
Supreme Court. But is not that result what narrowness and 
shallowness are sometimes all about? Moreover, it would not have 
been the first time that the Court distinguished different kinds of facts 
in this complicated, changing area of the law.89 The Court’s decision in 
Blakely is not a shining moment for minimalism. 
As discussed above in Part I, there exists an important distinction 
between deciding questions narrowly and shallowly, and leaving issues 
undecided. Blockbuster decisions such as Blakely, by virtue of their 
very breadth or depth, change the law significantly and thus 
necessarily create — as opposed to leave open — serious questions 
where none previously existed.90 It is incorrect, therefore, to equate 
unanswered questions with minimalism or to assume that the existence 
of unanswered questions reflects the practice of minimalism. Thus, not 
only would it be counterintuitive to describe the Court’s decision in 
Blakely as minimalist, but attempting to support that assertion would 
also require twisting the only available operational definition of 
minimalism.91 
 
88. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2542 n.13 (“To be sure, Justice Breyer and the other 
dissenters would forbid those increases of sentence that violate the constitutional principle 
that tail shall not wag dog. The source of this principle is entirely unclear. Its precise effect, if 
precise effect it has, is presumably to require that the ratio of sentencing-factor add-on to 
basic criminal sentence be no greater than the ratio of caudal vertebrae to body in the breed 
of canine with the longest tail. Or perhaps no greater than the average such ratio for all 
breeds. Or perhaps the median. Regrettably, Apprendi has prevented full development of 
this line of jurisprudence.”). 
89. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (declining to overrule Almendarez-Torres v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), in excluding “the fact of a prior conviction” from the coverage of 
its holding). 
90. As Part I also mentioned, the Justices may leave questions unanswered because a 
majority cannot agree on a rationale to support the judgment, as in the political 
gerrymandering case decided during the October 2003 Term. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. 
Ct. 1769 (2004) (affirming without majority opinion the judgment of a three-judge district 
court dismissing a political gerrymandering claim). 
91. It might be tempting to add that the overwhelming majority of commentators with 
relevant expertise believed, even before Booker came down, that the Federal Guidelines 
could not plausibly be distinguished from the Washington scheme invalidated by the Court 
in Blakely. See, e.g., Lithwick, supra note 72 (“The problem, of course, is that most scholars 
agree that the most logical inference one can draw from Blakely v. Washington is that 
significant portions of the federal guidelines are unconstitutional, too.”). In Blakely, the 
Solicitor General almost appeared to concede as much (reading between the lines) in his 
amicus brief in support of the State. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, characterized the 
Government’s position this way: “The United States, as amicus curiae, urges us to affirm. It 
notes differences between Washington’s sentencing regime and the Federal Sentencing 
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Professor Sunstein also omits discussion of another historic 
decision from the October 2003 Term, Crawford v. Washington.92 
Crawford is not the work of a minimalist Court. The Justices there 
changed the law of evidence in every criminal court in the United 
States regarding the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of confrontation 
with respect to testimonial hearsay,93 overruling a twenty-four-year-
old precedent, Ohio v. Roberts.94 The Court in Crawford held that 
“[w]here testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of 
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the 
Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”95  
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O’Connor, “dissent[ed] 
from the Court’s decision to overrule [Roberts].”96 His dissent rejects a 
minimalist interpretation of the majority opinion: 
[T]he Court’s adoption of a new interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause is not backed by sufficiently persuasive reasoning to overrule 
long-established precedent. Its decision casts a mantle of uncertainty 
over future criminal trials in both federal and state courts, and is by no 
means necessary to decide the present case.97 
According to the Chief Justice,98 reversal of the state supreme court’s 
judgment was amply supported by that tribunal’s contravention of the 
holding of Idaho v. Wright, a case in which the Court concluded that 
an out-of-court statement was not admissible simply because its 
truthfulness was corroborated by other evidence at trial.99 In the Chief 
 
Guidelines but questions whether those differences are constitutionally significant.” Blakely, 
124 S. Ct. at 2538 n.9. Justice O’Connor expressed a similar understanding of the 
Government’s view in her dissent: “The structure of the Federal Guidelines . . . does not, as 
the Government half-heartedly suggests, provide any grounds for distinction.” Id. at 2549 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the Blakely decision lends itself to the charge of 
disingenuousness. “The writing is on the wall,” a cynic might have contended just after 
Blakely was decided, “and certain courts of appeals already have gotten the message.” On 
this view, “one case at a time” really meant “it’s only a matter of time.” Warranted or not, 
the disingenuousness critique is not relevant here because it concerns motivational issues 
that do not appropriately affect the question whether a given decision is minimalist. See 
supra Part I. 
92. 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). 
93. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST., 
amend. VI. 
94. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not bar 
admission of an unavailable witness’s statement against a criminal defendant if the statement 
bears “adequate ‘indicia of reliability,’” a test met when the evidence either falls within a 
“firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bears “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness”). 
95. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374. 
96. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment). 
97. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added).  
98. Id. at 1378 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment). 
99. 497 U.S. 805, 820-24 (1990). 
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Justice’s view, the testimonial hearsay at issue in Crawford’s case had 
been admitted based on that previously rejected rationale.100 
A defender of the claim that the Court’s decision in Crawford is 
minimalist might observe that the Justices left open questions 
concerning which kinds of statements qualify as testimonial, including 
whether dying declarations or excited utterances qualify. But as Part I 
and the above discussion of Blakely make clear, asserting that the 
Court left questions unanswered does not demonstrate the presence of 
minimalism. The Court in Crawford could have resolved the case 
narrowly based on precedent; instead, it rendered a remarkably broad 
decision. 
2. McConnell and Sabri 
Because so many statutory provisions were challenged in the 
historic campaign finance decision from the October 2003 Term, 
McConnell v. FEC,101 a comprehensive analysis of the Court’s three 
separate majority opinions would be inappropriate in this setting. 
Instead, I will highlight general evidence of breadth and depth in the 
expansive reasoning and language of the Court’s lead opinion. 
McConnell involved eleven actions challenging the 
constitutionality of numerous statutory provisions set forth in the five 
titles of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”).102 
The Court decisively upheld almost all of BCRA’s most important 
provisions, including Title I’s regulation of the use of “soft money” by 
political parties, officeholders, and candidates, and Title II’s 
prohibition of corporate and labor-union use of general treasury funds 
for communications that are intended to, or have the effect of, 
influencing the outcome of federal elections.103 Commentators debate 
the soundness of the Court’s reasoning, and they dispute whether the 
reform effort that culminated in BCRA’s enactment can make a 
difference in view of the inevitability of effective evasions. I am aware 
of no one on either side of those disputes, however, who views the 
Court as having shaped its numerous holdings as narrowly and 
shallowly as reasonably possible.  
Nor is it apparent what broader and deeper options existed that 
the Justices deliberately chose to forego in favor of a minimalist path. 
 
100. See also Leading Cases, supra note 64, at 322 (“[I]f the Court were truly concerned 
with avoiding questions it need not reach, it could have simply resolved the entire case with 
‘a citation to Idaho v. Wright,’ as Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested.”) (quoting 124 S. Ct. at 
1378 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment)). 
101. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
102. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 
U.S.C.). 
103. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 223-24. 
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The Court emphatically and enthusiastically upheld BCRA’s most 
important provisions. Indeed, “[e]ven academics who support the 
result in McConnell complain that the Court did not apply sufficiently 
demanding scrutiny and was overly deferential to Congress in judging 
whether BCRA was properly tailored to preventing the corruption or 
appearance of corruption claimed to justify the law.”104 One 
commentator, for example, observes that “[t]he Court not only upheld 
BCRA against constitutional challenge; it lavished it and prior 
congressional regulatory efforts with effusive praise as furthering the 
needs of a well-functioning democracy.”105 In one instance among 
several, the Court’s lead opinion introduced BCRA as “the most 
recent federal enactment designed to purge national politics of what 
was conceived to be the pernicious influence of ‘big money’ campaign 
contributions.”106 
In sustaining BCRA’s core provisions, moreover, the Court 
displayed an expansive understanding of political “corruption.” 
Specifically, the Court conceived corruption broadly to include 
contributions that may purchase special access to political influence.107 
“By focusing on special access,” one commentator notes, “the Court 
shifted from Buckley’s emphasis on the possible effects of money on 
actual policymaking to its effects on the opportunity to influence 
policymaking or gain special access,” a move that “will make it easier 
for courts to uphold contribution caps in various forms.”108 Of course, 
not all those “various forms” were before the Court in McConnell; the 
breadth of the Court’s conception of corruption thus evidences the 
decision’s nonminimalist nature. The Court, moreover, even intimated 
that BCRA was justified as a “governmental effort to advance 
participation in self-government itself.”109 That is an extraordinarily 
broad and deep rationale for validating congressional campaign-
finance regulations like BCRA. 
 
104. Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Foreword: The 
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 134 (2004) (citing 
Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance 
Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31 (2004)). 
“[I]n their embrace of legislative deference,” Professor Hasen writes, the Justices “have 
abdicated their responsibility to carefully balance competing constitutional concerns and to 
police legislatively enacted campaign finance regulations for self-interest.” Hasen, supra, at 
60. 
105. Hasen, supra note 104, at 59 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115-18, 206 n.88). 
106. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
107. Id. at 150-51, 156, 174-75 (emphasizing Congress’s interest in limiting special 
access). 
108. Pildes, supra note 104, at 151-52. 
109. Id. at 149 (“Reflecting the present-day democratic disaffection . . . , the Court cast 
campaign finance regulation as a response to the ‘cynical assumption that large donors call 
the tune’ and the ‘dispiriting’ consequences of that assumption for public participation in 
elections and self-government.”) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143-44, 153). 
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In addition, the majority virtually invited further congressional 
legislation aimed at eliminating corruption, thereby suggesting that the 
Court’s holdings were quite broad and deep: 
 Many years ago we observed that “[t]o say that Congress is without 
power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard . . . an election from 
the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation 
in a vital particular the power of self-protection.” Burroughs v. United 
States, 290 U.S. [534,] 545 [(1934)]. We abide by that conviction in 
considering Congress’s most recent effort to confine the ill effects of 
aggregated wealth on our political system. We are under no illusion that 
BCRA will be the last congressional statement on the matter. Money, 
like water, will always find an outlet. What problems will arise, and how 
Congress will respond, are concerns for another day.110 
Concerns for another day they may be, but on this day the Court was 
almost encouraging Congress to continue combating the corrosive 
effects of money on the political system. A minimalist Court would 
not have been so supportive of Congress’s concerns. By definition, an 
invitation to further legislation does not reflect a minimalist approach 
to adjudicating constitutional cases — that is, such encouragement 
does not exemplify “the phenomenon of saying no more than 
necessary to justify an outcome, and leaving as much as possible 
undecided.”111 
In sum, the Court articulated a robust conception of corruption in 
McConnell, one moving it practically to congratulate Congress for its 
work and to invite further legislative action. Because “[l]ower courts 
showing fidelity to McConnell will have a difficult time striking down 
most campaign finance regulation,”112 and because of the reasons for 
that difficulty canvassed above, the decision is not fairly viewed as 
minimalist. 
Sabri v. United States113 does not warrant extended discussion in 
this setting because the majority opinion’s unqualified endorsement of 
broad federal spending power is manifestly nonminimalist. At issue in 
the case was the constitutionality of a federal criminal law, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 666(a)(2), which prohibits bribing state and local officials of entities 
that receive at least $10,000 in federal funds. The petitioner, a real 
estate developer, was arrested and indicted under the statute after 
offering bribes to a city councilman in the hopes of obtaining, among 
other things, city regulatory approvals.114  
 
110.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 223-24. 
111.  SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 3-4. 
112. Hasen, supra note 104, at 72.  
113. 124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004). 
114. Id. at 1944. 
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The Court could have sustained the statute on any number of 
relatively narrow grounds. Because of the widely recognized 
possibility that Congress could use the spending power to circumvent 
the federalism-based limits imposed by the Court on the commerce 
power,115 one option was to hold only that § 666(a)(2) falls within 
Congress’ authority under the Spending and Necessary and Proper 
Clauses because bribery inherently implicates commercial activity.116 
Another possibility was to limit the holding to bribery of officials in a 
position to impact how federal funds are spent.117 Alternatively, the 
Court could have upheld the statute under its existing Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.118 Like the congressional regulation of local 
“loan sharking” activities upheld in Perez v. United States,119 bribery of 
public officials has a substantial effect on interstate commerce when 
considered in the aggregate.120 The commercial nature of bribery also 
brings § 666(a)(2) within the commerce power under United States v. 
Lopez121 and United States v. Morrison.122 
Instead of choosing any of those available paths, the Court 
underscored the breadth of federal power to legislate pursuant to the 
spending and necessary and proper hooks, holding that Congress may 
enact criminal statutes as long as their general prohibitions have some 
rational connection to protecting the purposes of federal funding.123 
Stressing that “[m]oney is fungible”124 and that the statute addresses 
bribery problems at the source “by rational means” 125 is not the work 
 
115. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the 
Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could 
Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 460 (2003) (noting the “many commentators” who 
“have proposed that Congress should respond to the Rehnquist Court’s states’ rights 
decisions by using the spending power to circumvent those limitations on congressional 
power”).  
116. Leading Cases, supra note 64, at 382-83 (noting the narrower option proposed in 
the text while articulating Sabri’s breathtaking implications for the values animating the 
Court’s federalism jurisprudence).  
117. Id. (rejecting the proposal in the text as a plausible interpretation of the Court’s 
opinion).  
118. Justice Thomas relied on the commerce power to uphold the statute. He took 
exception to “the scope the Court gives to the Necessary and Proper Clause as applied to 
Congress’ authority to spend.” 124 S. Ct. at 1949 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).  
119. 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
120. Id. at 151-55. 
121. 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (stressing that the criminal statute at issue “by its terms 
has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one 
might define those terms”). 
122. 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (emphasizing “the role that the economic nature of the 
regulated activity plays in our Commerce Clause analysis”). 
123. Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1946-47. 
124. Id. at 1946. 
125. Id. 
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of a Court concerned to approve narrowly a particular use of the 
spending power — let alone approve it as narrowly as reasonably 
possible. Under the Court’s reasoning, any official of any entity 
receiving any amount of federal funds can be brought within the scope 
of federal criminal laws. 
3. Davey and Lane 
In fairness, it should be pointed out that the Court may have 
rendered a couple of minimalist decisions in important cases during 
the October 2003 Term. In Locke v. Davey,126 the Justices considered 
Washington State’s Promise Scholarship Program, which had been 
created to help academically gifted students pay for college. The state 
constitution prohibits students from using a Promise Scholarship to 
pursue a devotional theology degree. Respondent Joshua Davey was 
awarded such a scholarship and chose pastoral ministries, a devotional 
theology degree, as one of his majors. Upon learning he could not use 
his scholarship to pursue that degree, Davey sued under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. The state-mandated scholarship denial, he argued, violated the 
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause by discriminating against 
religion because excluding religious alternatives was not required by 
the federal Establishment Clause.127 
By a vote of seven to two, the Court rejected Davey’s free exercise 
challenge, upholding Washington’s decision to exclude students who 
pursue a devotional theology degree from its otherwise-inclusive 
scholarship aid program. Writing for the majority, the Chief Justice 
arguably limited the Court’s holding to contexts where taxpayer 
funding is used to train religious leaders: 
The State’s interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is 
substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor 
burden on Promise Scholars. If any room exists between the two 
Religion Clauses, it must be here. We need not venture further into this 
difficult area in order to uphold the Promise Scholarship Program as 
currently operated by the State of Washington.128 
The Court could have gone further by rejecting broadly the notion 
that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits excluding religious alternatives 
(and only religious alternatives) from state funding programs that the 
Establishment Clause allows. That was the breathtaking implication of 
 
126. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004). 
127. Under controlling Supreme Court precedent, Washington was not compelled by 
the federal Establishment Clause to exclude devotional degrees from its otherwise inclusive 
aid program because the independent and private choices of scholarship recipients sever the 
connection between government funding and religious training. See, e.g., Witters v. 
Washington Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986). 
128. Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1315. 
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respondent Joshua Davey’s argument and Justice Scalia’s dissent.129 
According to such reasoning, for example, the inclusion of sectarian 
private schools (along with secular private schools) in the voucher 
program at issue in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris130 became 
constitutionally required under the Free Exercise Clause once the 
Court held that such inclusion is constitutionally permissible under the 
Establishment Clause. 
On the other hand, the Chief Justice’s opinion for the Court in 
Davey is ambiguous; it is reasonably read expansively as having 
rejected the broader rationale just identified: 
These two Clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise 
Clause, are frequently in tension. Yet we have long said that “there is 
room for play in the joints” between them. In other words, there are 
some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not 
required by the Free Exercise Clause. 
 This case involves that “play in the joints” described above.131 
Like the majority opinion, Justice Scalia’s dissent suggests that more 
was being decided in Davey than the use of public funds to train future 
religious leaders: 
When the State makes a public benefit generally available, that benefit 
becomes part of the baseline against which burdens on religion are 
measured; and when the State withholds that benefit from some 
individuals solely on the basis of religion, it violates the Free Exercise 
Clause no less than if it had imposed a special tax. 
 That is precisely what the State of Washington has done here. It has 
created a generally available public benefit, whose receipt is conditioned 
only on academic performance, income, and attendance at an accredited 
school. It has then carved out a solitary course of study for exclusion: 
theology.132 
In an attempt to preempt any overreading of the Court’s opinion, 
however, Justice Scalia underscored that “[t]oday’s holding is limited 
to training the clergy.” Yet even he conceded that “its logic is readily 
extendible, and there are plenty of directions to go.”133 The very lack 
of a clear distinction in the Davey decision between the holding and 
logical implications in dicta favors a nonminimalist interpretation. A 
narrower option would have been to “sa[y] no more than necessary to 
justify [the] outcome, and leav[e] as much as possible undecided.”134 
 
129. Id. at 1315-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissent. 
130. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
131. Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1311 (citations omitted). 
132. Id. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
133. Id. at 1320 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
134. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 3-4. Despite expressing some 
uncertainty about the scope of the holding in Davey, Professor Douglas Laycock has 
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The Court’s decision in Tennessee v. Lane135 constitutes a more 
certain instance of minimalism. The plaintiffs-respondents were 
paraplegics who filed an action for damages and equitable relief, 
alleging that the State of Tennessee and several of its counties had 
denied them physical access to the State’s courts in violation of Title II 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”).136 Among 
other things, Title II provides: “[N]o qualified individual with a 
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 
participation or denied the benefits of the services, programs or 
activities of a public entity.”137 The legal question before the Court was 
Title II’s validity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Court held that Title II constitutes a valid exercise of Congress’ 
Section 5 power to enforce Section 1’s substantive guarantees, but 
limited its holding to the class of cases implicating the fundamental 
right of access to the courts — the factual context at issue in the case. 
The Justices could have issued several broader holdings. The Court 
could have concluded that Title II may never be used by private 
litigants to sue states for money damages, as it had held in University 
of Alabama v. Garrett regarding Title I of the ADA,138 and as the State 
of Tennessee had urged in Lane.139 Or the Court could have concluded 
that states may always be sued for money damages by private parties 
under Title II, as the Solicitor General had argued in Lane.140 Instead, 
the Court in Lane held only that states may be sued by citizens for 
money damages when the fundamental constitutional right of access to 
the courts is implicated. 
 
convincingly advanced a nonminimalist interpretation of the Court’s decision. See Douglas 
Laycock, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term—Comment: Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of 
Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes But Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 155, 161 (2004) (“Davey also poses important questions about the boundaries of its 
holding. As written, it applies only to funding the training of clergy, but it may well be 
extended to all funding decisions . . . .”); id. at 171 (“Davey held that when the state elects to 
fund a category of private-sector programs, it may facially discriminate against religious 
programs within the category.”); id. at 173 (“The terse opinion implies more than it states.”); 
id. at 185 (“But Davey is likely to lead to a more general principle that all religious programs 
and institutions can be excluded from funding programs.”). 
135. 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004). 
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000). 
137. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
138. 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Title I of the ADA, which prohibits employment 
discrimination against the disabled, was not validly enacted under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and thus that the Eleventh Amendment bars private money-
damages actions for violations of Title I). 
139. See generally Brief of Petitioner, Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004) (No. 02-
1667). 
140. See generally Brief for the United States, Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004) 
(No. 02-1667). 
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It is not readily apparent from this disposition how the Court 
reasonably could have decided the case more narrowly and shallowly 
— the Court’s congruence-and-proportionality jurisprudence from 
City of Boerne v. Flores141 onward precludes a wholly case- or fact-
specific analysis. The outcome in Lane, moreover, appears to reflect a 
conscious choice because all the Justices knew from the briefing that 
broader options were on the table. The theory of judicial minimalism, 
therefore, accounts for at least one significant decision rendered by 
the Supreme Court during the October 2003 Term. 
B. Decisions Analyzed Improperly 
1. Not Reaching the Merits: Newdow and Padilla 
Other cases from the past Term might appear to some 
commentators to reveal “a restrained judicial role,”142 but evidence of 
an affinity for minimalism is less apparent upon close examination. It 
is true, as Professor Sunstein underscores,143 that the Court “refused to 
reach the merits” in two important cases. That fact by itself, however, 
does not evidence minimalist decisionmaking. Rather, answering the 
minimalism question requires one to determine whether the Court 
consciously chose the narrowest and shallowest option when broader 
and deeper alternatives were reasonably available. Judged against this 
criterion, the Court’s decision in the Pledge of Allegiance case appears 
minimalist, but its ruling in the case of Jose Padilla is not. 
In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,144 the Court held 
that respondent Michael Newdow could not challenge the inclusion of 
the words “under God” in recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance at 
his daughter’s public elementary school. The Court so concluded 
based on a novel, “prudential” — that is, not constitutionally required 
— standing theory. Specifically, Justice Stevens wrote these words for 
the Court: 
 In our view, it is improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim 
by a plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that 
are in dispute when prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse 
effect on the person who is the source of the plaintiff’s claimed standing. 
When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to affect the 
outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay its hand 
 
141. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (articulating the congruence-and-proportionality requirement 
in holding that Congress had exceeded its Section 5 authority when it enacted the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993). Specifically, the Court held that, for a federal statute to 
be valid under Section 5, “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the 
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.” Id. at 508.  
142. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10. 
143. Id. 
144. 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004). 
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rather than reach out to resolve a weighty question of federal 
constitutional law. . . . We conclude that, having been deprived under 
California law of the right to sue as next friend, Newdow lacks prudential 
standing to bring this suit in federal court.145 
Chief Justice Rehnquist countered that “the Court may have 
succeeded in confining this novel principle almost narrowly enough to 
be, like the proverbial excursion ticket — good for this day 
only . . . .”146 Like the Chief Justice, Justice O’Connor would have 
reached the merits and affirmed the constitutionality of public-school 
Pledge-recitation policies that include the words “under God.”147 
Professor Sunstein sees a Court that “invoked procedural 
principles” and “attend[ed] carefully to limits on its own authority . . . 
when fundamental issues are at stake.”148 Perhaps. But as the 
discussion in Part I makes clear, Professor Sunstein’s submission 
regarding Newdow is really a prudentialist point, not a minimalist one. 
In any event, the Chief Justice’s persuasive criticism that the Court 
was fashioning a prudential standing rule essentially “for this day 
only,” — a charge the majority did not seriously dispute — as well as 
the broader political context,149 suggests that the Court’s opinion will 
have the generative force of a rock. It is therefore not clear how the 
Court’s reasoning reasonably could have been any narrower and 
shallower. Moreover, the Court could have issued a much broader 
ruling by not crafting a novel prudential standing rule and instead 
deciding the merits of Newdow’s challenge to public-school Pledge-
recitation policies. Accordingly, the decision in Newdow does seem 
minimalist.150 
 
145. Id. at 2312. 
146. Id. at 2316 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment). 
147. Id. at 2321-27 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
148. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10. 
149. See Laycock, supra note 134, at 224 (“No matter how the Court defines a de 
minimis exception, it would be hard to fit the Pledge of Allegiance within it. In Newdow, it 
may have been politically impossible to affirm and legally impossible to reverse.”); id. at 245-
46 (“A decision to invalidate the Pledge would have galvanized supporters of government-
sponsored religious observances and quite possibly provoked a constitutional amendment.”).  
150. Recall, however, that a minimalist decision does not indicate a minimalist 
motivation. Several commentators have sided with the Chief Justice, suggesting that the 
Court created limits on its own authority in order to have its cake and eat it too: the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision striking down the local school district’s Pledge-recitation policy is no 
longer law, yet the Supreme Court did not have to say what the law is, potentially setting off 
a political firestorm during an election year. The charge of disingenuousness looms again. 
See, e.g., Stuart Taylor Jr., Our Imperial, Unjudicial, Disingenuous, Indispensable Court, 
NATIONAL JOURNAL, July 17, 2004, at 2215 (“In short, none of the nine consistently 
practices judicial restraint. And when the justices do invoke that ideal, it is often an exercise 
in disingenuousness. Take the 5-3 decision on June 14, which ducked the merits of the case 
in which a federal appeals court in California had ruled that ‘under God’ must be dropped 
when the Pledge of Allegiance is recited in schools . . . . The case presented a dilemma for 
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Before concluding that jurisdictional rulings necessarily evidence 
the presence of judicial minimalism, however, one should consider the 
case of Jose Padilla.151 Padilla is the American citizen who was 
apprehended by federal agents in Chicago’s O’Hare International 
Airport upon arrival from Pakistan. He was transported to New York 
on a material-witness warrant issued by the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York in connection with its 
grand-jury investigation into the September 11th terrorist attacks. He 
was then detained as an alleged “enemy combatant” in the 
Consolidated Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina by order of 
President Bush.152 Seeking to challenge his indefinite detention, 
Padilla filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the New York 
federal court against Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. As Professor 
Sunstein stresses, the Court, through the Chief Justice, did not decide 
the merits of the controversy, “insist[ing]” instead “on procedural 
 
the four liberals and Kennedy. A decision striking out ‘under God’ would have provoked an 
election-year firestorm, perhaps even a constitutional amendment.”). 
Perhaps tellingly, the Court did not heed one of its traditional policies of restraint — 
deference to the federal courts of appeals regarding the interpretation of state law — to 
support its holding that Newdow lacked prudential standing to sue. See, e.g., Bowen v. 
Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 908 (1988); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 346-47 (1976). The 
Ninth Circuit reasoned that, because noncustodial parents have a state-law right to expose 
their children to their beliefs and values, Newdow was injured since state law “surely does 
not permit official state indoctrination of an impressionable child on a daily basis with an 
official view of religion contrary to the express wishes of either a custodial or noncustodial 
parent.” Newdow v. United States Congress, 313 F.3d 500, 504-05 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court 
disagreed: 
The California cases [on which the Ninth Circuit relied in holding that Newdow had 
standing] simply do not stand for the proposition that Newdow has a right to dictate to 
others what they may and may not say to his child respecting religion. . . . The cases speak 
not at all to the problem of a parent seeking to reach outside the private parent-child sphere 
to restrain the acts of a third party. 
Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2311-12 (referencing In re Mentry, 142 Cal. App. 3d 260, 268 (1983) 
(reversing restraining order against noncustodial father forbidding him from engaging 
children in religious activities other than those approved by custodial mother); Murga v. 
Peterson, 103 Cal. App. 3d 498, 504-05 (1980) (refusing to restrain noncustodial parent 
wishing to expose his children to his religious views)). The Court’s understanding of 
California law was reasonable, but then so was the view of the court of appeals. At the very 
least, the Ninth Circuit’s understanding was not so unreasonable as to be unworthy of 
deference. As the Chief Justice argued, “[r]espondent does not seek to tell just anyone what 
he or she may say to his daughter, and he does not seek to vindicate solely her rights.” 
Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2316 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment). Rather, he observed, 
“respondent wishes to enjoin the School District from endorsing a form of religion 
inconsistent with his own views because he has a right to expose his daughter to those views 
without the State’s placing its imprimatur on a particular religion.” Id. at 2315. 
151. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). 
152. See Brief for Petitioner, app. D at 5a, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) 
(No. 03-1027) (reproducing the Presidential Order of June 9, 2002 directing the Secretary of 
Defense to detain Padilla). 
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constraints” and holding that Padilla had sued the wrong person in the 
wrong court.153 
Yet as Justice Stevens persuasively argued in dissent, those 
“procedural constraints” were not genuine constraints at all; rather, 
they were of the Court’s own choosing. The Court’s doctrine is riddled 
with exceptions to the immediate custodian “rule”:154 
 Although the Court purports to be enforcing a “bright-line rule” 
governing district courts’ jurisdiction, an examination of its opinion 
reveals that the line is far from bright. Faced with a series of precedents 
emphasizing the writ’s “scope and flexibility,” the Court is forced to 
acknowledge the numerous exceptions we have made to the immediate 
custodian rule. The rule does not apply, the Court admits, when physical 
custody is not at issue, or when American citizens are confined overseas, 
or when the petitioner has been transferred after filing, or when the 
custodian is “‘present’” in the district through his agents’ conduct. In 
recognizing exception upon exception and corollaries to corollaries, the 
Court itself persuasively demonstrates that the rule is not ironclad. It is, 
instead, a workable general rule that frequently gives way outside the 
context of “‘core challenges’” to Executive confinement. 
 In the Court’s view, respondent’s detention falls within the category 
of “‘core challenges’” because it is “not unique in any way that would 
provide arguable basis for a departure from the immediate custodian 
rule.” It is, however, disingenuous at best to classify respondent’s 
petition with run-of-the-mill collateral attacks on federal criminal 
convictions. On the contrary, this case is singular not only because it calls 
into question decisions made by the Secretary himself, but also because 
those decisions have created a unique and unprecedented threat to the 
freedom of every American citizen.155 
Justice Stevens also might have stressed — and not merely hinted 
at156— the risk of forum shopping by the Executive Branch.157 It is 
doubtful that the Government’s detention of alleged enemy 
 
153. In particular, the Court held that Melanie A. Marr, the commander of the South 
Carolina Naval Brig, is the only proper respondent to Padilla’s petition because she, not 
Secretary Rumsfeld, is Padilla’s custodian. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2717-22. The Court further 
concluded that the Southern District of New York did not have personal jurisdiction over 
Commander Marr. Id. at 2722-25. 
154. The general rule in habeas law is that the proper respondent to a habeas petition 
filed by a detainee who challenges the legality of his confinement is the prisoner’s immediate 
custodian — that is, the warden of the facility in which the detainee is being held. See, e.g., 
Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2731 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“All Members of this Court agree that 
the immediate custodian rule should control in the ordinary case and that habeas petitioners 
should not be permitted to engage in forum shopping.”). 
155. Id. at 2732-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
156. Id. at 2734-35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
157. Leading Cases, supra note 64, at 416 (noting that in the “context [of] executive 
detention,” the “habeas jurisdiction default rules” upon which the Padilla majority relied 
“empower limitless executive forum shopping”). 
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combatants within the Fourth Circuit is coincidental. That federal 
court of appeals is widely regarded as among the most conservative 
and pro-Government in the nation.158  
 In appearing to accept the Justices’ rhetoric of restraint 
uncritically in both Newdow and Padilla, the theory of minimalism 
risks giving the impression that it is strikingly idealistic, even naïve. 
But such an impression would be false: In his book on minimalism, 
Professor Sunstein is a realist in assessing justiciability doctrine: “It 
may be tempting to see these principles [of justiciability] as firm, rule-
bound law, allowing no room for discretionary judgments. But 
realistically speaking, justiciability doctrines are used prudentially and 
strategically . . . .”159 
By disposing of Padilla on the procedural ground it chose, 
moreover, the Court laid down a broad rule with inevitable 
implications for an important question of federal law that currently 
divides several federal courts of appeals: whether the Attorney 
General is a proper respondent to a habeas petition filed by an alien 
detained pending deportation.160 That issue matters because, among 
other things, “there are indications that the district courts in areas 
where immigration detention centers are located have been flooded 
with detainee habeas petitions. This influx may seriously threaten 
some district courts’ ability to consider petitions in a reasonably 
prompt manner.”161 Chief Justice Rehnquist dropped a footnote 
 
158. See, e.g., Deborah Sontag, The Power of the Fourth, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, § 6 
(Magazine), at 38 (detailing the court’s strong conservatism). There may be reason to 
question Sontag’s objectivity in view of how unfavorably she portrays the Fourth Circuit’s 
decisionmaking. I do not think it is controversial, however, to characterize that court as 
among the most conservative federal courts of appeals in the nation as a relative matter, just 
as it would not be controversial to characterize the Ninth Circuit as among the most liberal. 
159. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 39-40. Compare Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam) (“None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial 
authority than are the Members of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of the 
Constitution’s design to leave the selection of the President to the people, through their 
legislatures, and to the political sphere. When contending parties invoke the process of the 
courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and 
constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.”), with Cass Sunstein, 
What We’ll Remember in 2050, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Jan. 5, 2001, at B15-
16, reprinted in BUSH V. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY 339-40 (E.J. 
Dionne Jr. & William Kristol eds., 2001) (predicting that “millions of Americans [will come 
to] believ[e] that the court . . . acted in an unacceptably partisan manner, and not as a court 
of law at all,” and that the Court’s decision will be remembered in hindsight as “illegitimate, 
undemocratic, and unprincipled”). 
160. Compare Robledo-Gonzales v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2003) (Attorney 
General is not proper respondent), Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314 (6th Cir. 2003) (same), 
Vasquez v. Reno, 233 F.3d 688 (1st Cir. 2000) (same), and Yi v. Maugans, 24 F.3d 500 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (same), with Armentero v. INS, 340 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2003) (Attorney General 
is proper respondent). Cf. Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing the 
issue at length but not deciding the question). 
161. Armentero, 340 F.3d at 1069. 
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stating — without explanation — that the Court was not deciding the 
circuit split.162 But the Court’s reasoning, which focuses on the location 
of the detainee’s immediate physical custodian, appears squarely 
applicable in the INS setting. The Chief Justice reasoned as follows: 
 In accord with the statutory language and Wales’ immediate custodian 
rule, longstanding practice confirms that in habeas challenges to present 
physical confinement — “core challenges” — the default rule is that the 
proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is 
being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory 
official. No exceptions to this rule, either recognized or proposed [by 
Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion], apply here.163 
None of the exceptions discussed by the majority or Justice Kennedy 
— that is, a court-martial convict detained outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of any district court, nonphysical custody, dual custody, 
removal of the petitioner from a district’s territory after a petition has 
been filed, or certain kinds of unfair behavior by the Government164 — 
appears to apply in the INS context.165  
To generate direct implications for a question of such moment in 
an extraordinary, nonimmigration case and in the absence of much 
briefing on the probable consequences is aggressive. The Court’s 
chosen path is all the more aggressive because the outcome in Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld,166 the case involving an American citizen also detained in 
the South Carolina brig after his capture in Afghanistan, affects 
mightily — if not ultimately determines — the upshot of federal-court 
review of Padilla’s contentions.167 Indeed, it is not difficult to count 
five votes for the proposition that Padilla’s detention is 
 
162. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2718 n.8 (“In Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), we left 
open the question whether the Attorney General is a proper respondent to a habeas petition 
filed by an alien detained pending deportation. Id.[] at 189. . . . Because the issue is not 
before us today, we again decline to resolve it.”) (parallel citations omitted). 
163. Id. at 2718 (referencing Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885)) (citations and 
footnote omitted). 
164. Id. at 2718 n.9, 2721-24; id. at 2729 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
165. That said, it would be most welcome if the Court somehow were to prove this 
concern unfounded or if Congress were to address the problem by relieving some of the 
pressure on the affected district-court dockets.  
166. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
167. Padilla’s attorney, Donna Newman, refiled the habeas petition in South Carolina 
District Court. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Padilla v. Hanft, No. Civ. A. 2:04-2221-
26A (D.S.C. July 2, 2004). On February 28, 2005, U.S. District Judge Henry F. Floyd held 
that the President has no authority to detain Padilla as an enemy combatant, and he ordered 
the Government either to charge Padilla with a crime or to release him within forty-five 
days. See Padilla v. Hanft, No. Civ. A. 2:04-2221-26A, 2005 WL 465691, at *13 (D.S.C. Feb. 
28, 2005). The Government is currently appealing Judge Floyd’s decision to the Fourth 
Circuit. 
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unconstitutional: the four Padilla dissenters plus Justice Scalia.168 In 
his dissent in Hamdi, which was joined by Justice Stevens, Justice 
Scalia provides a historical analysis whose conclusion is sweeping: 
 Where the Government accuses a citizen of waging war against it, our 
constitutional tradition has been to prosecute him in federal court for 
treason or some other crime. Where the exigencies of war prevent that, 
the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, allows Congress to 
relax the usual protections temporarily. Absent suspension, however, the 
Executive’s assertion of military exigency has not been thought sufficient 
to permit detention without charge. No one contends that the 
congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force, on which the 
Government relies to justify its actions here, is an implementation of the 
Suspension Clause. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision below.169 
The same reasoning applies with (at least) equal force to Padilla given 
that the Government seized him on American soil, as opposed to in a 
theater of military operations abroad. 
In other words, the Court in Padilla had a narrower option. The 
Justices could have decided the merits, which had already in effect 
been decided in Hamdi, thereby avoiding a broad ruling on an 
unsettled procedural question with seemingly mammoth implications. 
But, it could be objected, how could the Court have reached the 
merits without deciding the threshold immediate-custodian question 
one way or the other? Justice Stevens explained how the Justices 
could have resolved that issue in a more factbound and narrow 
fashion: 
More narrowly, we agree that if jurisdiction was proper when the petition 
was filed, it cannot be defeated by a later transfer of the prisoner to 
another district. . . . 
 It is reasonable to assume that if the Government had given [Donna] 
Newman, who was then representing respondent in an adversary 
proceeding, notice of its intent to ask the District Court to vacate the 
outstanding material witness warrant and transfer custody to the 
Department of Defense, Newman would have filed the habeas petition 
then and there, rather than waiting two days. Under that scenario, 
respondent’s immediate custodian would then have been physically 
 
168. In Padilla, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, 
concluded that Congress had not authorized Padilla’s detention: “Consistent with the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals, I believe that the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4001(a), prohibits — and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, 115 
Stat. 224, adopted on September 18, 2001, does not authorize — the protracted, 
incommunicado detention of American citizens arrested in the United States.” 124 S. Ct. at 
2735, n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
169. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2660-61 (referencing the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)). For detailed discussion of Hamdi, see infra 
notes 208-222, 282-290 and accompanying text. 
 
SIEGEL 5.DOC 7/11/2005 8:17 AM 
1988 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1951 
 
present in the Southern District of New York carrying out orders of the 
Secretary of Defense. Surely at that time Secretary Rumsfeld, rather 
than the lesser official who placed the handcuffs on petitioner, would 
have been the proper person to name as a respondent to that petition. 
 The difference between that scenario and the secret transfer that 
actually occurred should not affect our decision, for we should not permit 
the Government to obtain a tactical advantage as a consequence of an ex 
parte proceeding. The departure from the time-honored practice of 
giving one’s adversary fair notice of an intent to present an important 
motion to the court justifies treating the habeas application as the 
functional equivalent of one filed two days earlier.170 
Despite initial appearances, therefore, Padilla is not a poster child for 
minimalism by virtue of its disposition on jurisdictional grounds. 
On the other hand, it could forcefully be argued that I just cheated 
in applying the operational definition of minimalism. I have shown 
that the approach of the Padilla dissenters was narrower than that of 
the majority. I have not demonstrated how the Padilla majority could 
have decided the case the same way — reversing the judgment of the 
Second Circuit — on a narrower ground. The point of the above 
analysis, however, was not to change (or forget) the rules of the 
minimalist inquiry, but to refute the claim that jurisdictional rulings 
are necessarily narrower and shallower than decisions on the merits. 
Applying minimalism’s operational definition to Padilla, it appears 
that a narrower option was reasonably available to the majority. 
Rather than deciding the controversial immediate-custodian question, 
the Court could have taken issue with the Second Circuit’s holding 
that the district court had personal jurisdiction over Secretary 
Rumsfeld under New York’s long-arm statute.171 As that court noted, 
the state’s statute had never been applied in an analogous setting,172 
and surely the New York legislature had never contemplated its 
application to the facts of Padilla. Granted, the Court’s typical 
practice is to defer to federal courts of appeals on questions of state 
law, but that did not stop the majority from showing no such deference 
in Newdow.173 Moreover, to the extent one insists on the rightness of 
the lower courts’ interpretation of New York’s long-arm statute, it 
appears that the “operational” definition of minimalism is more 
subject to dispute than we might at first imagine because its criteria 
require making substantive and contestable judgments on the merits 
of legal questions. 
 
170. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2731-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations and footnote 
omitted). 
171. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F. 3d 695, 708-710 (2d Cir. 2003) (analyzing the 
applicability of the state’s long-arm statute), rev’d, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). 
172. Id. at 710. 
173. See supra note 150. 
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It is noteworthy that four of the five members of the majority in 
the minimalist Pledge decision — Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, 
and Breyer — dissented in Padilla. Likewise, the Chief Justice and 
Justices O’Connor and Thomas, who were in the majority in Padilla, 
would have upheld the constitutionality of Pledge recitations in public 
schools. Only Justice Kennedy was in the majority in both cases. 
(Justice Scalia recused himself in the Pledge case after publicly 
criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s decision.174) With eight out of nine 
Justices on opposite sides of what Professor Sunstein sees as 
minimalist holdings, the question arises whether the theory of judicial 
minimalism provides a persuasive account of the Court’s 
decisionmaking in both those cases. At a minimum, minimalists bear 
the burden of offering a more complex, counterintuitive account, one 
that explains how minimalism emerges from shifting coalitions of 
Justices, some of whom are committed to a nonminimalist 
jurisprudence much of the time. 
2. Reaching the Merits: Rasul, Ashcroft v. ACLU, and Cheney 
Still other important decisions from the October 2003 Term reveal 
the limits of minimalism as an organizing framework for 
understanding the Court’s work. Professor Sunstein submits that the 
Justices decided the Guantanamo Bay, child online pornography, and 
energy task force cases “in the narrowest possible fashion.”175 Most of 
those opinions reveal a different picture. 
The Court, according to Professor Sunstein, evidenced minimalism 
in Rasul v. Bush176 by holding only that federal courts have authority 
to entertain habeas petitions filed by aliens held at Guantanamo 
Bay.177 Specifically, he stresses that “the court pointedly declined to 
specify the nature of the hearing — to say, for example, whether 
foreigners have a right to a lawyer.”178 He fails to register, however, 
that the threshold question of judicial power to entertain the petitions 
was the sole issue before the Justices when the case was decided. Here 
is the first sentence of Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court: 
 These two cases present the narrow but important question whether 
United States courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the 
legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in 
 
174. See 124 S. Ct. at 2304 (noting Justice Scalia’s recusal); Laycock, supra note 134, at 
159, n.19 (documenting the series of events culminating in Justice Scalia’s recusal). 
175. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10. 
176. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
177. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10. 
178. Id. 
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connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Base, Cuba.179 
To return to a recurring theme, not deciding questions not presented 
is not evidence of minimalism. 
On the other hand, there would seem to be no reason why 
evidence informing the minimalist inquiry should be limited to the 
merits stage as opposed to the certiorari stage, even if Professor 
Sunstein devotes almost all his attention to the former.180 Nor must 
evidence of minimalism be confined to the text of published opinions. 
When granting certiorari, the Court sometimes rewrites the questions 
presented as articulated by the parties or chooses to review only 
certain questions presented.181 Rasul is a good example of an instance 
in which the Court chose not to address a question of substantive 
rights that was presented at the certiorari stage. The Justices’ decision 
to proceed in such a fashion evidences narrowness.182 
Yet the Court reasonably could have resolved the threshold 
jurisdictional question in Rasul more narrowly. Specifically, the 
majority could have followed Justice Kennedy’s lead,183 making clear 
that its holding was limited to detainees held at Guantanamo Bay in 
 
179. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690. 
180. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34. 
181. See, e.g., Docket for Rasul v. Bush, No. 03-334, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ 
docket/03-334.htm (last visited April 1, 2005) (“Petition GRANTED limited to the following 
Question . . . .”); Docket for Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, No. 02-1624, at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/02-1624.htm (last visited April 1, 2005) (“Petition 
GRANTED limited to the following Questions . . . .”). 
Most of the time, moreover, the Justices have a variety of vehicles from which to choose 
at the certiorari stage. Those vehicles present different facts and therefore somewhat 
different legal questions for resolution. The Court typically makes decisions among those 
vehicles, albeit in a manner not accessible to public scrutiny. In choosing, the Justices could 
adopt a minimalist approach by choosing a fact pattern with narrower and shallower legal 
implications. 
182. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i-ii, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (No. 
03-334) [hereinafter Rasul petition] (two of three questions presented directed at the 
merits). Specifically, the first question presented raised the issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction under Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), see infra note 186, and the 
second and third (somewhat redundantly) asserted due process claims. For example, this was 
the third question presented in the petition: 
 Does the Due Process [C]lause of the Fifth Amendment permit the United States to detain 
foreign nationals indefinitely, in solitary confinement, without charges and without recourse 
to any legal process, so long as they are held outside the “ultimate sovereignty” of the 
United States, even when they are held in territory over which the United States has 
exclusive jurisdiction and control? 
Rasul petition at i-ii. For a discussion of the substantial confusion generated by the Supreme 
Court’s refusal to address the merits in Rasul, see infra Section III.A. 
183. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2701 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (“In light of the 
status of Guantanamo Bay and the indefinite pretrial detention of the detainees, I would 
hold that federal-court jurisdiction is permitted in these cases. This approach would avoid 
creating automatic statutory authority to adjudicate the claims of persons located outside the 
United States, and remains true to the reasoning of Eisentrager.”). 
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view of the area’s essentially unique legal status and the detainees’ 
indefinite detention.184 Instead, the broad and somewhat ambiguous 
reasoning in the majority opinion caused Justice Scalia, in dissent, to 
exclaim with some justification that “the Court boldly extends the 
scope of the habeas statute to the four corners of the earth,”185 and 
also to contend that the majority had implicitly overruled controlling 
precedent.186 Rasul is no instance of minimalism. 
Turning next to Ashcroft v. ACLU,187 Professor Sunstein asserts 
that “[t]he court followed a remarkably similar path in its inconclusive 
decision involving the Child Online Protection Act [(“COPA”)], 
which criminalizes the commercial posting of sexually explicit material 
that is ‘harmful to minors’” where the commercial entities posting the 
material do not verify that each online visitor is at least 18 years old.188 
“The court upheld a lower court’s temporary injunction against the 
act,” he notes, “but only on the narrow ground that less restrictive 
methods, like filtering software, might protect children more 
effectively than a criminal ban.”189 He further observes that the Court 
“[p]ostpon[ed] a final resolution” and instead “asked for a full trial, 
offering the government an opportunity to prove its claim that the act 
is the only realistic method of achieving Congress’s goal.”190 Justice 
 
184. The United States occupies a naval base at Guantanamo Bay under a lease and 
treaty recognizing Cuba’s ultimate sovereignty, but giving the United States “complete 
jurisdiction and control” for so long as it does not abandon the leased areas. Lease of Lands 
for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, T.S. No. 418; see also 
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690-91 (discussing this legal arrangement). 
185. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2706; see also Jeffrey Rosen, Divide and Rule, NEW REPUBLIC, 
July 26, 2004, at 11, 11 (“Cass R. Sunstein . . . praised the Court for deciding the 
Guantanamo Bay case in the ‘narrowest possible fashion,’ while Justice Antonin Scalia 
criticized the Court for indulging in ‘judicial adventurism of the worst sort.’”). 
186. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court today holds that the 
habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, extends to aliens detained by the United States military 
overseas, outside the sovereign borders of the United States and beyond the territorial 
jurisdictions of all its courts. This is not only a novel holding; it contradicts a half-century-old 
precedent on which the military undoubtedly relied . . . .”) (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 
339 U.S. 763 (1950)). Eisentrager concerned German nationals who were confined in the 
custody of the United States Army in Germany following their conviction by a military 
commission of having engaged in military activity against the United States in China after 
Germany’s surrender. The Court held that they had no right to file a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus to test the legality of their detention. Before Rasul came down, many jurists 
had thought the Guantanamo detainees were similarly situated — that is, aliens detained 
outside the territorial jurisdiction of any federal court. In Rasul itself, District Judge Colleen 
Kollar-Kotelly had dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 
2002), and the D.C. Circuit had affirmed, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
187. 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004). 
188. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10 (quoting COPA, 47 U.S.C. § 231 
(2000)). 
189. Id. 
190. Id. In evaluating COPA, the Court applied strict scrutiny to nonobscene sexual 
speech for the second time in recent years. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 
529 U.S. 803 (2000). That is a significant change in First Amendment law, and one with 
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Breyer, by contrast, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice O’Connor, 
would have had the Court construe the statute’s coverage narrowly to 
uphold it, rather than block Congress’ attempt to limit children’s 
widespread access to pornography on the World Wide Web.191 
Professor Sunstein is correct that the Court’s empirical focus on 
less restrictive alternatives is narrower and shallower than other paths 
the Justices might have taken. He also would have been right to 
suggest that a minimalist approach seems commendable in light of 
changes in computer technology (and thus in the facts on the ground 
in the case) since the litigation’s inception.192 The majority’s chosen 
course, nonetheless, was not the minimalist option. 
Several considerations, including the case’s procedural posture and 
the corresponding abuse-of-discretion standard of review, support the 
Court’s decision, but they do not suggest that the Justices can fairly lay 
claim to the mantle of minimalism. Because the only issue before the 
Court was whether to uphold or overturn the preliminary injunction, 
the decision was not minimalist just because the Justices decided only 
that question. As Professor Sunstein relates,193 the Court emphasized 
respondents’ submission that blocking and filtering software is less 
restrictive than the statutory scheme Congress had enacted; in the 
Court’s view, the Government had not shown it would be likely to 
disprove that contention at trial.194 
That, however, is not all the Court said: 
 Filters also may well be more effective than COPA. First, a filter can 
prevent minors from seeing all pornography, not just pornography 
posted to the Web from America. The District Court noted in its 
factfindings that one witness estimated that 40% of harmful-to-minors 
content comes from overseas. COPA does not prevent minors from 
having access to those foreign harmful materials. That alone makes it 
possible that filtering software might be more effective in serving 
Congress’ goals. Effectiveness is likely to diminish even further if COPA 
is upheld, because the providers of the materials that would be covered 
by the statute simply can move their operations overseas. It is not an 
answer to say that COPA reaches some amount of materials that are 
harmful to minors; the question is whether it would reach more of them 
 
which Justice Scalia registered his strong disagreement. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. at 
2797 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
191. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. at 2797-806 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
192. See id. at 2787 (noting that “the factual record does not reflect current 
technological reality”); see also SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 174 (“I 
urge that a form of minimalism makes particular sense for the new communications 
technologies, including the Internet. The most important reason is that the relevant facts are 
in flux and changing very rapidly, and the consequences of current developments are hard to 
foresee.”). 
193. See Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10. 
194. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. at 2790-95. 
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than less restrictive alternatives. In addition, the District Court found 
that verification systems may be subject to evasion and circumvention, 
for example by minors who have their own credit cards. Finally, filters 
also may be more effective because they can be applied to all forms of 
Internet communication, including e-mail, not just communications 
available via the World Wide Web. 
 That filtering software may well be more effective than COPA is 
confirmed by the findings of the Commission on Child Online 
Protection, a blue-ribbon commission created by Congress in COPA 
itself. Congress directed the Commission to evaluate the relative merits 
of different means of restricting minors’ ability to gain access to harmful 
materials on the Internet. It unambiguously found that filters are more 
effective than age-verification requirements. Thus, not only has the 
Government failed to carry its burden of showing the District Court that 
the proposed alternative is less effective, but also a Government 
Commission appointed to consider the question has concluded just the 
opposite. That finding supports our conclusion that the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in enjoining the statute.195 
A minimalist Court — that is, one concerned to decide the case before 
it as narrowly and shallowly as reasonably possible — would not have 
made it so clear to the courts below that it favors filtering software. 
After all, filters need not be more effective to support the district 
court’s entry of a preliminary injunction; equal effectiveness is 
sufficient. Judges tend not to like being reversed on appeal, and the 
judges who do the reversing know this very well. After learning that 
five Justices favor filtering software, the lower courts in Ashcroft v. 
ACLU probably will find it difficult to avoid putting a thumb (or two) 
on the scale in favor of filters during and after trial on remand. “The 
Court’s opinion leaves Congress and interested persons asking 
whether any regulation of nonobscene Internet materials can pass 
muster. . . . [T]he Court seemed to be telling Congress that, because 
filters already exist, Congress cannot regulate indecent 
communication on the Internet.”196 
 
195. Id. at 2792-93 (citations omitted). 
 196. Leading Cases, supra note 64, at 354, 361. The situation in Ashcroft v. ACLU 
illustrates the point developed in Part I that using democratic deliberation as the 
decisionmaking criterion renders minimalism nonfalsifiable because the question whether a 
decision is minimalist becomes endlessly debatable. That case creates a genuinely difficult 
problem for any Justice who wants to use his or her vote to advance democratic deliberation 
in the presence of social disagreement. On the one hand, the outdated factual record caused 
by rapidly changing computer technologies suggests that democratic deliberation might be 
enhanced most effectively by deciding less rather than more. On the other hand, the 
appearance of stringing Congress along and extending the agony yet again by prolonging the 
inevitable may be difficult to avoid once the Court sends the case back down again for 
further proceedings. Indeed, from the standpoint of facilitating democratic deliberation and 
responsiveness to the Court’s decisions, Justice Breyer makes a powerful case in his dissent 
that his approach is most efficacious. Specifically, he directs this rhetorical question at the 
majority opinion’s author, Justice Kennedy, who also dissented in Blakely: 
SIEGEL 5.DOC 7/11/2005 8:17 AM 
1994 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1951 
 
Finally, in Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia,197 Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club sued, among others, 
Vice President Cheney, seeking disclosure of the members of his 
energy-policy task force. The task force had been established to give 
advice and make energy-policy recommendations to President Bush. 
The complaint alleged that nonfederal employees and private 
lobbyists regularly attended and fully participated in the task force’s 
nonpublic meetings. The two public-interest groups urged that such 
participation triggered the procedural and disclosure requirements of 
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”), which apply where 
not all participants are “full-time, or permanent part-time, [federal] 
 
 [W]hat has happened to the “constructive discourse between our courts and our 
legislatures” that “is an integral and admirable part of the constitutional design”? [Blakely v. 
Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2550 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)]. After eight years of 
legislative effort, two statutes, and three Supreme Court cases the Court sends this case back 
to the District Court for further proceedings. What proceedings? I have found no offer by 
either party to present more relevant evidence. What remains to be litigated? I know the 
Court says that the parties may “introduce further evidence” as to the “relative 
restrictiveness and effectiveness of alternatives to the statute.” But I do not understand what 
that new evidence might consist of. 
 Moreover, Congress passed the current statute “[i]n response to the Court’s decision in 
Reno” striking down an earlier statutory effort to deal with the same problem. Congress read 
Reno with care. It dedicated itself to the task of drafting a statute that would meet each and 
every criticism of the predecessor statute that this Court set forth in Reno. It incorporated 
language from the Court’s precedents, particularly the Miller standard, virtually 
verbatim. . . . What else was Congress supposed to do? 
 . . . [S]ome Members of the Court . . . have taken the view that the First Amendment simply 
does not permit Congress to legislate in this area. Others believe that the Amendment does 
not permit Congress to legislate in certain ways, for example, through the imposition of 
criminal penalties for obscenity. There are strong constitutional arguments favoring these 
views. But the Court itself does not adopt those views. Instead, it finds that the Government 
has not proved the nonexistence of “less restrictive alternatives.” That finding, if appropriate 
here, is universally appropriate. And if universally appropriate, it denies to Congress, in 
practice, the legislative leeway that the Court’s language seem to promise. If this statute does 
not pass the Court’s “less restrictive alternative” test, what does? If nothing does, then the 
Court should say so clearly. 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. at 2804-05 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justices 
motivated by minimalism in Ashcroft v. ACLU risk suffering a self-inflicted wound. As 
Justice Breyer fears, it is possible Congress and concerned citizens will view the Court as 
having transformed interbranch dialogue and democratic deliberation into an exercise in 
futility. Democratic actors can become fatigued. 
 Yet it could be argued in response to Justice Breyer that what COPA accomplished was 
less anything that could fairly be called democratic deliberation than it was simply an effort 
by Congress to go as far legislatively as it could go along the child-protective lines it favored 
subject to the unavoidable constraint of satisfying the Court. Such a congressional reaction 
to Supreme Court decisionmaking constitutes neither deliberation nor “constructive 
discourse” in any strong sense, id. at 2804 (Breyer, J., dissenting), and it certainly is not the 
sort of rational reflection that Professor Sunstein champions. 
 This example demonstrates a key point: Figuring out whether and how to be a 
minimalist can require a complicated calculus that often will prove uncertain and 
controversial. Likewise, commentators who endeavor to confirm or disconfirm the presence 
of democracy-promoting decisionmaking criteria in judicial opinions face an almost 
impossible empirical task. 
197. 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004). 
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officers or employees.”198 Among other things, the district court 
entered orders allowing the plaintiffs to conduct limited discovery to 
ascertain the energy task force’s structure and membership. 
The Vice President requested that the district court halt 
proceedings on separation of powers grounds. Professor Sunstein 
observes that “the [Supreme Court] again proceeded cautiously” by 
rejecting that argument, but “requir[ing] the lower courts to take 
account of the vice president’s need for confidentiality.”199 The D.C. 
Circuit, the Supreme Court essentially held, had wrongly concluded 
that the Government’s ability to protect its rights by asserting 
executive privilege in the district court stripped the appellate court of 
mandamus authority. At the same time, however, the Court did not 
order the court of appeals to issue mandamus against the district 
court, instead leaving it to the appellate court to address the parties’ 
arguments and other matters bearing on the question whether 
mandamus should issue. In short, the Court concluded only that lower 
courts entertaining mandamus petitions involving the President or 
Vice President must consider separation of powers concerns even 
absent assertion of executive privilege.200 
Professor Sunstein is correct that the Court “proceeded 
cautiously.” The Court’s display of caution seems well explained by 
several legal and factual considerations. These include: the 
extraordinary nature of the mandamus remedy;201 the sensitive 
separation of powers concerns surrounding the prospect of judicial 
interference with the President’s access to confidential policy advice;202 
a disagreement among the Justices on the question whether the Vice 
President argued merely for less discovery or for no discovery in the 
District Court;203 and the significant overlap between the information 
 
198. Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2583. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the Vice 
President and other defendants did not qualify for the disclosure exemption in § 3(2)(C)(i) 
of the statute, which excludes from the statute’s open-meeting and disclosure requirements 
“any committee . . . composed wholly of full-time, or permanent part-time, [federal] officers 
or employees.” Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2)(C)(i) (2000). 
199. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10. 
200. Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2586-93. 
201. See, e.g., Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1947) (holding that mandamus is a 
“drastic and extraordinary” remedy “reserved for really extraordinary causes”). 
202. See Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2582 (noting that enforcement of the discovery orders 
“might interfere with” the Vice President and other senior executive-branch officials “in the 
discharge of their duties and impinge upon the President’s constitutional prerogatives”). 
203. See id. at 2595-601 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg argued that the 
Court’s reasoning did not justify its judgment. The remand order, she noted, was premised 
on the possibility that the District Court ordered excessive discovery, but the Government, in 
her view, had been resisting any discovery. See id. To the extent she is correct, Cheney may, 
at least in part, evidence what Professor Sunstein calls “subminimalism.” SUNSTEIN, ONE 
CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 10 (suggesting that “subminimalism” can be “understood 
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discovery would produce and the ultimate relief sought by the 
plaintiffs.204 It does not follow, however, that the Court’s display of 
caution necessarily evidences minimalism. The question, as far as 
minimalism is concerned, is not whether the Justices were cautious, 
but whether the Court consciously chose to decide the case as 
narrowly and shallowly as possible when broader and deeper options 
were reasonably available. 
According to those criteria, the Cheney decision does seem well 
described as minimalist. The Court did not resolve the question 
whether mandamus should issue when it could have, and reasonably 
narrower and shallower options do not appear to have been available. 
Rather than accede to the government’s request that the Court invoke 
constitutional separation of powers principles fundamentally to 
rework the executive branch’s obligations in the litigation process, the 
Justices sent the case back to the Court of Appeals.205 
Yet, another aspect of the Cheney decision reveals a nonminimalist 
tendency. At the end of his opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy 
authored these words: 
Other matters bearing on whether the writ of mandamus should issue 
should also be addressed, in the first instance, by the Court of Appeals 
after considering any additional briefs and arguments as it deems 
appropriate. We note only that all courts should be mindful of the 
burdens imposed on the Executive Branch in any future proceedings. 
Special considerations applicable to the President and the Vice President 
suggest that the courts should be sensitive to requests by the 
Government for interlocutory appeals to reexamine, for example, 
whether the statute embodies the de facto membership doctrine.206 
The Court here is saying more than it must along the dimension of 
breadth in order to decide the case. Specifically, the Justices are 
reiterating their skepticism, voiced by some members of the Court at 
oral argument, that the D.C. Circuit’s “de facto membership doctrine” 
even exists.207 That signal to the court of appeals to reassess its own 
precedent is not the handiwork of jurists who consciously choose to 
write as narrowly and shallowly as reasonably possible. 
 
as decisions that are conclusory and opaque, and offer little in the way of justification or 
guidance for the future”); see also id. at 15-16 (further discussing subminimalism). 
204. See Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2593-94 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stressing the point set 
forth in the text). 
205. Accord, Leading Cases, supra note 64, at 257 & n.3 (2004) (interpreting Cheney to 
be “a model of judicial minimalism” and citing One Case at a Time).  
206. Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2593. 
207. According to the D.C. Circuit’s de facto membership doctrine, the regular 
participation of nongovernment officials renders them de facto members of a government 
committee, such that the committee may not benefit from the statutory exemption under 
section 3(2) of FACA. See Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 915 
(D.C. Cir. 1993); supra note 198.  
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3. Stepping Up: Hamdi 
Professor Sunstein acknowledges that Hamdi is the Court’s “most 
expansive ruling.”208 He nonetheless applauds its “strong minimalist 
features”209 — specifically, the failure of a majority of the Justices to 
announce that detained enemy combatants always have a right to 
counsel, the Court’s decision to leave open the question whether a 
military tribunal could try Americans, and the Justices’ decision not to 
engage the Bush administration’s aggressive claims regarding the 
scope of the President’s inherent Article II powers as Commander in 
Chief.210 As Professor Sunstein appears to concede, however, 
descriptive minimalism can rely only modestly on Hamdi: the 
decision’s nonminimalist features render it a historic triumph for civil 
liberties in wartime. 
In her plurality opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, 
Justice O’Connor hardly “sa[id] no more than necessary” to decide 
the case.211 On the contrary, she emphatically rejected the executive 
branch’s assertions of breathtaking presidential power. “We reaffirm 
today the fundamental nature of a citizen’s right to be free from 
involuntary confinement by his own government without due process 
of law,”212 she wrote, underscoring that “[i]t is during our most 
challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment to 
due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we 
must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we 
fight abroad.”213 Through those words, with which most of her 
colleagues agreed, it is almost as if Justice O’Connor is rejecting the 
premise of Korematsu on behalf of the Court and vowing never to 
 
208. Sunstein, The Smallest Court, supra note 10. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. Moreover, the four Justices who joined Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion 
announcing the judgment of the Court decided the question whether Congress had 
authorized Hamdi’s detention as narrowly as reasonably possible. Specifically, the plurality 
assumed without deciding that: (1) congressional authorization of Hamdi’s detention was 
constitutionally required; and (2) the Non-Detention Act (NDA), 18 U. S. C. § 4001(a), 
which provides that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United 
States except pursuant to an Act of Congress,” applied to Hamdi’s detention. 124 S. Ct. at 
2639-40. The plurality then concluded that the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(“AUMF”), see supra notes 168-169, enacted one week after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, satisfied the NDA’s requirement of an “Act of Congress.” 124 S. Ct. at 
2640-43. The AUMF authorized the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those . . . he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks.” Justices Souter and Ginsburg, by contrast, would have considered each of the 
above three questions and decided all of them against the executive branch. 124 S. Ct. at 
2652-59 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and 
concurring in judgment). 
211. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 3-4. 
212. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2647 (2004). 
213. Id. at 2648. 
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make the same mistake again.214 “We therefore hold,” she wrote, “that 
a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy 
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, 
and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions 
before a neutral decisionmaker.”215 “In so holding,” Justice O’Connor 
continued: 
we necessarily reject the Government’s assertion that separation of 
powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in 
such circumstances. Indeed, the position that the courts must forgo any 
examination of the individual case and focus exclusively on the legality of 
the broader detention scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable 
view of separation of powers, as this approach serves only to condense 
power into a single branch of government. We have long since made 
clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it 
comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens. Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
[Co. v. Sawyer], 343 U.S. [579.] 587 [(1952)]. Whatever power the United 
 
214. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (affirming petitioner’s 
conviction for remaining in a part of a designated “military area” from which persons of 
Japanese ancestry had been ordered excluded). Justice Jackson wrote these chilling words in 
dissent: 
 Much is said of the danger to liberty from the Army program for deporting and detaining 
these citizens of Japanese extraction. But a judicial construction of the due process clause 
that will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the 
order itself. A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the 
military emergency. Even during that period a succeeding commander may revoke it all. But 
once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the 
Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions 
such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in 
criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies about like 
a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim 
of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and 
thinking and expands it to new purposes. All who observe the work of courts are familiar 
with what Judge Cardozo described as “the tendency of a principle to expand itself to the 
limit of its logic.” A military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it 
is an incident. But if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of 
the Constitution. There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in 
its own image. Nothing better illustrates this danger than does the Court’s opinion in this 
case. 
Id. at 245-46 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF 
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921)) (footnote omitted). It may be that some of Justice 
O’Connor’s inspired language in Hamdi was drafted within the long shadow cast by 
Korematsu. That decision, though never overruled, has been firmly rejected by the court of 
history. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, A Prescription for Perilous Times, 93 GEORGETOWN L.J. 
(forthcoming Summer 2005) (reviewing GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE 
SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 
(2004)). Justice Souter’s opinion in Hamdi explicitly relied on Korematsu. His conclusion 
that Congress had not authorized Hamdi’s detention was based in part on his recognition 
that the Non-Detention Act, see supra note 210, was passed “for the purpose of avoiding 
another Korematsu.” 124 S. Ct. at 2653 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment). For an examination of Korematsu’s possible 
impact on the Court’s decision in Hamdi, see Neil S. Siegel, Korematsu’s Shadow 
(unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
215. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648. 
SIEGEL 5.DOC 7/11/2005 8:17 AM 
August 2005] A Theory in Search of a Court 1999 
States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with 
other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most 
assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties 
are at stake. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (it was 
“the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our 
political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three 
coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty”); Home 
Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (“[E]ven the 
war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding 
essential liberties.”). Likewise, we have made clear that, unless Congress 
acts to suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the Judicial 
Branch to play a necessary role in maintaining this delicate balance of 
governance, serving as an important judicial check on the Executive’s 
discretion in the realm of detentions. See [INS v.] St. Cyr, 533 U.S. [289,] 
301 [2001] (“At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as 
a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that 
context that its protections have been strongest”). Thus . . . it would turn 
our system of checks and balances on its head to suggest that a citizen 
could not make his way to court with a challenge to the factual basis for 
his detention by his government, simply because the Executive opposes 
making available such a challenge. Absent suspension of the writ by 
Congress, a citizen detained as an enemy combatant is entitled to this 
process.216 
That the Justices could have said more — a fact of life at the Court — 
is insufficient to establish the presence of minimalism. 
The decision in Hamdi is not minimalist in part because the 
plurality here is displaying greater analytical depth than it must to 
decide the case. Justice O’Connor’s opinion is grounded in a highly 
theorized — indeed, Madisonian217 — conception of the separation of 
powers. Articulating grave concerns about the condensation of power 
in the executive branch was not necessary to decide the case; a 
reliance on precedent — for example, the decisions cited by Justice 
O’Connor in the quotation above — would have sufficed. Four other 
Justices, moreover, displayed similar levels of theorization.218 
 
216. Id. at 2650-51 (parallel citations omitted). 
217. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 262 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982) 
(“But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same 
department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary 
constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others.”). 
218. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2652-60 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in judgment) (concluding that congressional 
authorization was necessary to detain Hamdi based explicitly on a Madisonian 
understanding of human nature and the separation of powers, and determining that Hamdi’s 
detention was unlawful based on a lack of congressional authorization); id. at 2660-74 
(Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding based on an extensive historical 
analysis that Hamdi’s detention was unlawful absent suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus). Justice Souter further stated:  
For reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of the Government asked to counter a 
serious threat is not the branch on which to rest the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the 
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Turning to the circumstances of Hamdi’s detention, Justice 
O’Connor pulled no punches in assessing the Government’s conduct 
to date: “Plainly, the ‘process’ Hamdi has received is not that to which 
he is entitled under the Due Process Clause.”219 And though the 
plurality did, among other things,220 decline to announce that detained 
enemy combatants always have a right to counsel, Justice O’Connor 
also wrote these words: 
Since our grant of certiorari in this case, Hamdi has been appointed 
counsel, with whom he has met for consultation purposes on several 
occasions, and with whom he is now being granted unmonitored 
meetings. He unquestionably has the right to access to counsel in 
connection with the proceedings on remand.221 
Because Hamdi was no longer being denied access to counsel, and 
because the Government could no longer plausibly maintain that it 
had an interest in again denying Hamdi access to counsel after 
allowing him to consult with an attorney several times, the Court was 
not required to address the extent of Hamdi’s right to counsel on 
remand. Thus, the decision in Hamdi is not minimalist along the 
analytical dimension of breadth as well. 
In sum, Justice O’Connor made clear that neither assertions of 
presidential power nor pleas for judicial restraint would succeed in 
removing the Court from the critical separation of powers dynamic 
“when individual liberties are at stake.”222 The outcome in Hamdi was 
not maximalist, but neither was it minimalist along the dimension of 
depth or breadth. Indeed, the Court there confronted much of what 
minimalism would have had the Justices avoid. 
 
balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory; the 
responsibility for security will naturally amplify the claim that security legitimately raises. A 
reasonable balance is more likely to be reached on the judgment of a different branch, just 
as Madison said in remarking that ‘the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several 
offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other — that the private interest 
of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights.’ The Federalist No. 51, p. 349 (J. 
Cooke ed. 1961). Hence the need for an assessment by Congress before citizens are subject 
to lockup, and likewise the need for a clearly expressed congressional resolution of the 
competing claims. 
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2655 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in 
judgment); see also supra note 169 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Scalia’s 
dissenting opinion). 
219. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2651. 
220. Justice O’Connor also wrote: “Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as 
the most reliable available evidence from the Government in [an enemy combatant] 
proceeding,” id. at 2649; “the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor 
of the Government’s evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and 
fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided,” id.; and “[t]here remains the possibility that the 
standards we have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly 
constituted military tribunal,” id. at 2651. 
221. Id. at 2652. 
222. Id. at 2650. 
SIEGEL 5.DOC 7/11/2005 8:17 AM 
August 2005] A Theory in Search of a Court 2001 
C. The Verdict 
If judicial minimalism is supposed to have empirical relevance as a 
description of the way the Supreme Court actually decides cases, then 
the theory requires an operational definition that can be falsified — a 
definition, in other words, that is capable of relatively uncontroversial 
application. Part I identified the best such definition available, and this 
Part has applied the operational criterion to many of the most 
important decisions from the October 2003 Term. The upshot of the 
foregoing investigation does not bode well for minimalism’s 
descriptive aspirations: the suggestion that judicial minimalism 
triumphed at the Supreme Court during the October 2003 Term is, 
with few exceptions, descriptively false. 
Rather than consistently apply an operational definition of judicial 
minimalism, Professor Sunstein perceives evidence of minimalism 
where the Justices left questions undecided, resolved a case on 
jurisdictional grounds, decided only the question presented, or 
proceeded with caution. Professor Sunstein’s theory of judicial 
minimalism, therefore, appears either to have no operational criterion, 
or to be false. The Justices did not consciously choose to resolve most 
of the cases discussed above as narrowly and shallowly as reasonably 
possible, even though broader and deeper rationales were reasonably 
available to them.223 
Not even Justice O’Connor. In his review of One Case at a Time, 
Jeffrey Rosen chose the label “O’Connorism” to describe minimalist 
legal theory.224 “By embracing shallowness as a judicial virtue,” he 
 
223. It has been suggested to me that Professor Sunstein might find the outcome of this 
Article’s empirical analysis unsurprising because there may be a certain disingenuousness to 
his assertion that most of the Justices are minimalists. Rather than really believing that to be 
the case, this argument runs, his descriptive claim is aspirational — that is, he means to 
persuade the current conservative Court and possibly the next one that it ought to be a 
minimalist decisionmaking institution. This argument might be regarded as a social variant 
of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in physics; the suggestion is that Professor Sunstein 
hopes to change the Court’s decisionmaking through the very act of observing its 
decisionmaking. See, e.g., HEINZ R. PAGELS, THE COSMIC CODE: QUANTUM PHYSICS AS 
THE LANGUAGE OF NATURE 89-91 (1982) (discussing the impossibility of knowing the 
position and momentum of an electron simultaneously, because the act of observing its 
position changes its momentum). Lacking direct evidence to substantiate such a charge 
regarding Professor Sunstein’s motivation, I do not think it appropriate to question his bona 
fides; this article certainly takes him at his word. 
It may be worth noting, however, that the use of descriptive claims as vehicles for 
normative advocacy is rampant not only in legal academia, but also in legal practice and 
judicial decisionmaking. For example, when the top-side and bottom-side briefs — or 
majority opinions and dissents for that matter — seem to be discussing different cases in 
describing the holdings of the very same precedents, there is often more going on than a 
genuine disagreement regarding the meaning and binding force of past decisions. Given the 
normative power of the actual in both law and popular culture, convincing people that what 
ought to be already is would seem to be an effective rhetorical strategy. 
224. Rosen, supra note 48, at 46. 
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wrote, “Sunstein is advocating a version of the personalized 
jurisprudence of Sandra Day O’Connor.”225 By likening minimalism to 
“O’Connorism,” Professor Rosen, among other things, effectively 
clipped the wings of Professor Sunstein’s aggressive descriptive claim 
that most of the current Justices embrace his theory.226 
The foregoing analysis of decisions that came down during the 
October 2003 Term suggests that minimalism is indeed closer to 
“O’Connorism” than to an apt description of the Court’s work as a 
whole. During that year, the Court was not minimalist; instead, Justice 
O’Connor tended to be one of the most inclined towards narrow and 
shallow decisions among nine jurists with diverse ideological and 
methodological commitments. And though Justice O’Connor’s vote 
often proved critical, she sometimes was not in the majority in 
important cases. Emblematic examples include Blakely, Crawford, and 
Ashcroft v. ACLU. 
But the story of the October 2003 Term is more complicated than 
that. The above investigation also suggests that not even Justice 
O’Connor is genuinely a judicial minimalist. In the October 2003 
Term, the theory could not adequately account for much of her voting 
behavior. When she was in the majority in momentous cases, she often 
could not be fairly described as a minimalist. That is one 
jurisprudential lesson to be drawn from decisions such as McConnell, 
Rasul, Padilla, and Hamdi. In Newdow, moreover, she was neither in 
the majority nor a minimalist. Accordingly, it can prove difficult to 
make persuasive minimalist generalizations about the Justice most 
oriented towards narrow and shallow decisionmaking, let alone the 
entire Court. If the October 2003 Term is consistent with a larger 
picture, and I suspect it is, this Court does not tend to be a minimalist 
decisionmaking institution.227 
 
225. Id. 
226. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
227. An adequate defense of that claim is beyond the scope of this inquiry. See supra 
Introduction to Part II. And while offering only a sampling of decisions as suggestive of the 
Court’s generally nonminimalist character runs the risk of selection bias, id., it is nonetheless 
worth considering whether these controversial cases from the past ten years are fairly 
described as having been decided as narrowly and shallowly as reasonably possible: 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute making it a crime for 
two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due 
Process Clause); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding constitutional the 
University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action admissions program); Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (holding that an Ohio school voucher program, which 
included sectarian private schools, did not violate the Establishment Clause); Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in 
capital prosecutions is violated by an Arizona statute pursuant to which, following a jury 
adjudication of a defendant’s guilt of first-degree murder, the trial judge alone determines 
the presence or absence of the aggravating factors required by state law for imposition of the 
death penalty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the execution of any 
mentally retarded individual constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the 
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Academic theories of judicial behavior, including Professor 
Sunstein’s contribution, at times perceive general truths when 
outcomes are highly contingent on the tendencies of particular Justices 
— proclivities admitting of important exceptions that may ultimately 
swallow the proffered general rule. If Justice O’Connor is succeeded 
shortly by more of a maximalist, the theory of judicial minimalism may 
join her in retirement.228 Even if she had stayed on the Court for 
several more years, the theory would have found itself struggling to 
explain the Justices’ decisions if the October 2003 Term had turned 
out to be a harbinger of those to come. 
III. NORMATIVE PROBLEMS 
Part II demonstrated that minimalism does not provide a viable 
empirical account of recent Rehnquist Court decisionmaking. The 
question remains, however, whether there exists reason to adopt 
minimalism as a normative theory of judicial review. Can normative 
considerations be invoked to justify minimalism? This Part argues that 
the answer is no. Specifically, I show that the empirically testable 
version of minimalism does not serve the various substantive values 
rejected in Part I as an inadequate account of any version of 
minimalism that would be empirically testable — namely, cost 
 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) 
(holding that application of New Jersey’s public accommodations law to require the Boy 
Scouts to admit homosexuals violated the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of expressive 
association); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that, other than the fact 
of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt); 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that neither the Commerce Clause 
nor Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorized Congress to enact a provision of the 
Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, providing a federal civil remedy for 
victims of gender-motivated violence); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that 
Congress may not subject a state to any suit in state court without its consent); Clinton v. 
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (holding that the Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C. § 691 
et seq., violated the Presentment Clause); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (relying 
on a Tenth Amendment anticommandeering rationale in holding unconstitutional certain 
interim provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s), which 
required state and local law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on 
prospective handgun purchasers and to perform certain related tasks); City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (articulating a novel congruence-and-proportionality 
requirement in holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et 
seq., exceeded Congress’ enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that 
Congress may not use any Article I, Section 8 power to abrogate state sovereign immunity); 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that all federal, as well as 
state and local, affirmative action programs are subject to strict scrutiny). 
228. On July 1, 2005, Justice O’Connor informed President Bush of her “decision to 
retire from [her] position as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States 
effective upon the nomination and confirmation of [her] successor.”  
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/press/oconnor070105.pdf. 
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minimization, democracy promotion, and achieving overlapping 
consensus, thereby negotiating theoretical disagreements. 
Professor Sunstein claims that judicial minimalism possesses a 
number of “attractive features.”229 He suggests that minimalism “is 
likely to reduce the burdens of judicial decision,” by which he means 
that minimalism makes it easier for jurists on a multimember court 
“who disagree on a great deal,” and who are short on both time and 
access to information, to get their work done.230 Professor Sunstein 
also asserts that “minimalism is likely to make judicial errors less 
frequent and (above all) less damaging,” because “[a] court that leaves 
things open will not foreclose options in a way that may do a great 
deal of harm,” especially in light of “unanticipated bad 
consequences.”231 Further, and perhaps most critically, Professor 
Sunstein believes that judicial minimalism promotes democratic 
deliberation by leaving more questions to the democratic process: 
 There is a relationship between judicial minimalism and democratic 
deliberation. Of course minimalist rulings increase the space for further 
reflection and debate at the local, state, and national levels, simply 
because they do not foreclose subsequent decisions. And if the Court 
wants to promote more democracy and more deliberation, certain forms 
of minimalism will help it to do so.232 
Relatedly, Professor Sunstein argues that minimalist jurists, by 
rendering shallow decisions, help a democratic society to negotiate the 
reasonable yet irreconcilable disagreements that are inevitable in a 
modern, pluralistic community.233 Finally, Professor Sunstein suggests 
that minimalism allows jurists to avoid the need for constitutional 
theory.234 Unlike originalists, for example, minimalists need not “take 
a position on some large-scale controversies about the legitimate role 
of the Supreme Court in the constitutional order.”235 
In my judgment, Professor Sunstein fails to establish any of these 
claims. Moreover, I will argue that the Court’s principal role in our 
constitutional system — that is, guardian of the fundamental rights of 
individuals — often will be advanced most effectively through 
relatively broad and deep judicial decisionmaking, not through narrow 
and shallow opinions. 
 
229. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 4. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at ix-x, 50-51. 
234. Id. at 8 (section entitled “Against Theories, against Rules”). 
235. Id. 
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A. Multiplying Decision and Error Costs: The Court as Guide 
Despite his initial suggestion that minimalism “is likely to reduce 
the burdens of judicial decision,”236 Professor Sunstein later 
acknowledges that the answer to this empirical question is uncertain 
and complex: 
A court that economizes on decision costs for itself may in the process 
‘export’ decision costs to other people, including litigants and judges in 
subsequent cases who must give content to the law. Such costs may also 
be faced by those who are trying to plan their affairs and who must try to 
figure out what the law will ultimately be.237 
Similarly, Professor Sunstein first asserts that “minimalism is likely to 
make judicial errors less frequent and (above all) less damaging.”238 
Elsewhere in One Case at a Time, however, he is not so optimistic. He 
acknowledges that minimalism may not be “the best way to reduce 
total error costs,” particularly in situations where “lower courts and 
subsequent cases would generate an even higher rate of error.”239 
Such a costly course of events seems difficult to avoid after 
decisions such as Tennessee v. Lane.240 The Justices there offered lower 
courts little guidance regarding how they should handle future cases in 
which private plaintiffs seek money damages from States for violations 
of Title II of the ADA. To begin with, the Court declined to clarify 
whether the fundamental-rights dimension of the case was critical to 
the holding. Assuming for the sake of argument it was, moreover, the 
Court did not specify how much of a nexus is required between a 
case’s factual setting and heightened judicial scrutiny under Section 1 
of the Fourteenth Amendment before Congress may be held to have 
enacted valid Section 5 legislation in the many Title II contexts not 
covered by the Court’s decision.241 In addition, the Court did not offer 
any guidance regarding how to identify the relevant “context” within 
which its novel and inappropriately labeled “as applied” Section 5 
analysis should be conducted. Why was the implicated class of cases in 
Lane “access to courts,” as opposed to something narrower (such as 
physical access to court proceedings) or something broader (such as 
access to all government buildings and programs)? Judged against 
whatever the Supreme Court will hold in future decisions, it seems 
inevitable that a number of lower courts will decide (or already have 
 
236. Id. at 4. 
237. Id. at 48. 
238. Id. at 4. 
239. Id. at 49-50. 
240. See supra notes 135-141 and accompanying text (discussing Lane). 
241. Recall that Title II covers every one of a state’s public services, programs, and 
activities. See supra notes 136-137 and accompanying text. 
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decided) Title II-Section 5 cases incorrectly, either by holding an 
application of Title II in a particular setting valid or invalid under 
Section 5.242 
Because the Justices did not answer the central analytical questions 
generated by the Court’s resolution of the case, it seems perilous to 
offer much more by way of prediction at this point. The Court left 
open the possibility that all of Title II is valid under Section 5. It also 
left open the possibility that Title II is valid under Section 5 only in 
those classes of cases (however defined) implicating fundamental 
rights — though in Lane itself the factual nexus to any fundamental-
rights violation was highly attenuated.243 
As a general matter, there seems to be little reason to suppose that 
overall costs in the legal and political systems will be minimized by a 
Supreme Court that decides cases as narrowly and shallowly as 
reasonably possible. Pre-empirically, it appears more likely that 
whatever costs the Court saves itself by taking a minimalist path will 
be outweighed by the costs incurred by litigants, lower courts, and 
political bodies at the federal, state, and local levels, as judicial, 
legislative, and executive officials are required to act in the wake of 
guidance from the Court that would have been clearer had its opinion 
been broader and deeper.244 Professor Rosen has advanced a 
persuasive argument along these lines: 
When the Supreme Court issues terse opinions whose reasoning is hard 
to discern, it compounds the confusion of inferior courts in precisely 
those cases where the relevant actors are pleading for a clear resolution. 
The result is a national exercise in clairvoyance, as lower courts, citizens, 
and legislatures spend great energy and expense trying to puzzle through 
 
242. On May 16, 2005, the Court granted certiorari in, and consolidated, two cases 
involving the Section 5 validity of Title II as applied to the administration of prison systems. 
See United States v. Georgia, No. 04-1203; Goodman v. Georgia, No. 04-1236.  
243. Respondent Beverly Jones never came close to suffering a violation of any of her 
constitutional rights. She was a disabled court reporter who alleged lost work and inability to 
participate in the judicial process. See 124 S. Ct. at 1982-83; id. at 2000, n.4 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting). Respondent George Lane presents a somewhat closer case. He was initially 
required to crawl up two flights of stairs to attend the hearings in his criminal trial. When he 
returned to the courthouse for a subsequent hearing and refused to crawl again or be carried 
up the stairs by officers, he was arrested and imprisoned for failure to appear. The state, 
however, later held a preliminary hearing in Lane’s case in the first-floor courthouse library 
and offered to move all further proceedings to an accessible courthouse in a town nearby. 
See 124 S. Ct. at 1982-83; id. at 2000, n.4 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Considering Jones and 
Lane together, it would seem inappropriate after Lane for courts to require even as much as 
a reasonable probability of a fundamental-rights violation in a particular setting before 
declaring Title II valid under Section 5 across the implicated class of cases. Some possibility 
of such a violation would appear to suffice. Of course, in the event all of Title II remains 
valid under Section 5, this “nexus” question need not be asked.  
244. See, e.g., Leading Cases, supra note 64, at 253 (calling Cheney “a model of judicial 
minimalism” and stating that “[t]he Court’s opinion, if nothing else an exercise in measured 
unclarity, left lower courts with little guidance in effectuating the Court’s holding”).  
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problems that the Supreme Court promised but then refused to 
resolve.245 
Perhaps this concern explains why Professor Sunstein vacillates 
between asserting confidently that “minimalism is likely to make 
judicial errors less frequent and (above all) less damaging,”246 and 
conceding cautiously that “[i]t is not, however, clear that minimalism 
is the best way to reduce total error costs.”247 
Indeed, often it is critical that the Court provide guidance, either 
to the lower courts or to the political process. Even nonminimalist 
decisions such as Blakely, which leave thousands of judges and lawyers 
alike in semi-desperate need of guidance, ought to give pause to 
advocates of less-is-more jurisprudence. Judicial “activism,” 
“overreaching,” and “arrogance” are charges that are most familiar,248 
but there also exists the danger that the Court will say too little. As 
Chief Justice Marshall stressed early on, “[i]t is emphatically” not only 
the “province” but also the “duty” of the Supreme Court “to say what 
the law is.”249 
Professor Sunstein acknowledges “the need for planning”; he notes 
that “[m]inimalism might be threatening to the rule of law insofar as it 
does not ensure that decisions are announced in advance.”250 At the 
same time, however, one must wonder whether that “qualificatio[n]”251 
will tend to swallow the theory most of the time. Granted, Blakely 
constitutes an extreme example of a pressing need for planning. But 
that need will often be pressing when the Supreme Court grants 
certiorari in a case to resolve a conflict over the resolution of an 
important but unsettled question of federal law.252 In other words, 
cases in which the need for planning — for ordering human affairs in 
reliance on a relatively stable legal rule — is not implicated do not 
tend to be important cases. And with grants so few and therefore so 
precious,253 the Justices endeavor to avoid granting certiorari to 
resolve unimportant questions. 
 
245. Rosen, supra note 48, at 46; see also supra note 81. 
246. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 4. 
247. Id. at 49. 
248. See, e.g., George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (February 2, 2005), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-11.html (“Because marriage is 
a sacred institution and the foundation of society, it should not be re-defined by activist 
judges. For the good of families, children, and society, I support a constitutional amendment 
to protect the institution of marriage.”). 
249. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
250. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 55. 
251. Id. at 57. 
252. See Rosen, supra note 48, at 46 (“But isn’t ‘planning’ important in every case that 
the Supreme Court agrees to hear?”). 
253. See supra note 33. 
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Rasul, another nonminimalist decision, also nicely illustrates this 
point. The Court’s refusal in that case to move beyond the threshold 
jurisdictional question and to address the merits of the petitioners’ due 
process challenges has resulted in substantial confusion. Specifically, 
two federal district courts in the D.C. Circuit have rendered 
diametrically opposed decisions concerning the constitutional rights of 
the detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.254 The Court’s 
relative modesty in Rasul, therefore, has generated massive headaches 
for litigants and the lower federal courts. One legal commentator has 
captured the public spectacle with insightful humor: 
 It’s almost impossible to comprehend how, as of yesterday, two 
federal judges in the District of Columbia managed to read Rasul to 
mean two completely opposite things — as though it’s one of those pick-
your-own-endings books from the 1980s. . . . 
. . . . 
 . . . [W]hile we are laying blame here, it may be worth considering that 
the Supreme Court bears the most responsibility for not getting Rasul 
right — or at least clear — the first time. The opaque John Paul Stevens 
opinion, coupled with Anthony Kennedy’s concurrence (which at least 
implies that military tribunals might provide sufficient due process for 
these prisoners), are ambiguous enough to allow the government and 
judiciary to play the kinds of semantic chutes and ladders it now 
plays. . . . No one opposes judicial restraint or minimalism; judges should 
decide only the matters directly before them. But when the highest court 
in the land only half decides a matter squarely before it — when it 
decides that prisoners languishing for years in detention have certain 
inalienable-rights-to-be-named-later, it’s tantamount to having decided 
nothing at all.255 
This wasteful legal wrangling in the D.C. Circuit might not be taking 
place had the Supreme Court decided more in Rasul. Yet minimalism 
would have had the Court decide even less. 
 
254. Compare Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding, in denying 
habeas petitions, that the President’s war powers and a federal statute authorized him to 
capture and detain combatants; that his authority was not confined to capture and detention 
on battlefields in Afghanistan; that nonresident aliens captured and detained outside the 
United States have no cognizable constitutional rights; that their capture and detention did 
not violate any federal law or treaty giving rise to rights; and that separation of powers 
principles prohibited inquiry into the conditions of their detention under international 
norms), with In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding 
that the detainees have a Fifth Amendment right to due process of law; that they stated a 
Fifth Amendment claim because the Combatant Status Review Tribunal relied on classified 
information not shown to them; that due process required the tribunal to determine whether 
evidence was gained through torture; that the detainees had a valid due process claim based 
on the government’s use of an overly broad definition of “enemy combatant” subject to 
indefinite detention; and that the Geneva Conventions applied to Taliban detainees, but not 
to members of al Qaeda). 
255. Dahlia Lithwick, Supreme Chickens?: The high court’s Gitmo confusion comes 
home to roost, SLATE, Feb. 1, 2005, at http://politics.slate.msn.com/id/2113003. 
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Newdow exemplifies another problem with the prospect of a truly 
minimalist Court. The Chief Justice’s criticism of the majority opinion 
as disingenuous, as in essence “good for this day only,” raises a 
significant concern: From the standpoint of legal technique and craft, 
deciding a case as narrowly and shallowly as reasonably possible may 
invite unprincipled decisionmaking because the minimalist decision 
commits the Court to little in the future. And even if one assumes that 
the Justices themselves (including future Justices) will be able to tell 
when and why they “cheated” in a previous case, they make law for 
many other courts as well. The jobs of the jurists who sit on those 
tribunals are difficult enough without their also having to figure out 
when to take Supreme Court decisions seriously and when to squint.256 
Moreover, unprincipled judicial decisionmaking imposes distinct 
legitimacy costs on the Court itself. 
Considering decision costs and error costs together, Professor 
Sunstein offers this sobering qualification, which threatens to give 
away his entire theory: 
 In this light it would be foolish to suggest either that minimalism is 
generally a good strategy or that minimalism is generally a blunder. 
Everything depends on contextual considerations. The only point that is 
clear even in the abstract is that sometimes the minimalist approach is 
the best way to minimize the sum of error costs and decision costs.257 
This is a remarkably weak statement. Substitute the words 
“maximalism” and “maximalist approach” for “minimalism” and 
“minimalist approach” in the above quotation, and the reasoning 
remains equally plausible. It seems, therefore, that Professor 
Sunstein’s theoretical defense of judicial minimalism has less to do 
with minimizing decision and error costs, and more to do with other 
considerations.258 
 
256. Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer have written: 
The vision of the Court as constitutional interpreter, which is our vision, . . . is a vision that 
sees the Court being much more concerned with instructing, guiding, helping, and, indeed, 
ordering other bodies and other branches than the volume and style of its current output 
would suggest. And if these are or should be the Court’s concerns, then we would expect to 
see more clear rules, fewer divided judgments without a majority opinion, more concern by 
the Justices for the Court speaking with a single voice than with making their own points or 
even with insisting on their own view about the outcome, even more concern with stare 
decisis, and in general more Supreme Court behavior befitting the law-maker that the 
Supreme Court undeniably is, and in our judgment inevitably must be. . . . [U]nder our 
vision it needs to spend much more time thinking about how it can give better guidance to 
Congress, to the executive, to lower courts, and to the states. 
Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. 
COMMENT. 455, 479-80 (2000) (footnotes omitted). 
257. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 50. 
258. Professor Sunstein’s concession that the case for minimalism ultimately turns on 
distinctly empirical — as opposed to theoretical — questions is noteworthy because he 
advocates minimalism without first having conducted any sort of empirical analysis of the 
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B. Leaving Things to the Courts, Not the Country 
“My most important goal,” Professor Sunstein writes in the 
Preface to One Case at a Time, “is to explore the connection between 
judicial minimalism and democratic self-government.”259 Likewise, the 
Conclusion to the book is entitled “Minimalism and Democracy.”260 
From start to finish, the theme on which he lays greatest emphasis is 
the connection he proffers between judicial minimalism and 
democratic deliberation: 
 The final and perhaps most important point involves the relationship 
between minimalism and democracy. We have seen that one of the major 
advantages of minimalism is that it grants a certain latitude to other 
branches. It allows the democratic process a great deal of room in which 
to adapt to coming developments, to produce mutually advantageous 
compromises, and to add new information and perspectives to legal 
issues.261 
Respectfully, Professor Sunstein fails to establish that minimalism 
significantly advances his deliberative democratic project: rather than 
leaving issues to the democratic process and promoting democratic 
deliberation, minimalist Justices often simply postpone the questions 
they do not decide for future litigation. Consider again, for example, 
the minimalism evident in Newdow.262 The Court in effect left the 
question presented on the merits — the constitutionality of voluntary 
public-school Pledge-recitation policies — for the lower federal courts 
and, possibly, for the Court itself in a later case. Absent a 
constitutional amendment, the federal courts, not the democratic 
process, will ultimately decide whether public-school recitations of the 
phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance violate the 
Establishment Clause. Even putting the decisionmaker aside, 
moreover, it is difficult to see what the minimalism evident in Newdow 
 
relative costs and benefits. His approach illustrates the force of Judge Richard Posner’s 
argument that constitutional law is in need of less theory and more facts: 
[C]onstitutional theory is not responsive to, and indeed tends to occlude, the greatest need 
of constitutional adjudicators, which is the need for empirical knowledge . . . . I know that 
just getting the facts right can’t decide a case. There has to be an analytic framework to fit 
the facts into; without it they can have no normative significance. Only I don’t think that 
constitutional theory can supply that framework. Nor that the design of the framework, as 
distinct from fitting the facts into it, is the big problem in constitutional law today. The big 
problem is not lack of theory, but lack of knowledge — lack of the very knowledge that 
academic research, rather than the litigation process, is best designed to produce. But it is a 
different kind of research from what constitutional theorists conduct. 
Posner, supra note 1, at 3. 
259. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at xiv. 
260. Id. at 259. 
261. Id. at 53. 
262. See supra notes 142-150 and accompanying text. 
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has to do with the principled promotion of democratic deliberation or 
negotiation of moral fault lines in American society. The vast majority 
of Americans, the President, and members of Congress are not going 
to be persuaded that it is unconstitutional for public-school children 
voluntarily to recite the words “under God” in the Pledge. 
Newdow is hardly unique in this regard; the consequences of other 
minimalist decisions could be used to make a similar point. After the 
Court’s holding in Tennessee v. Lane,263 the courts, not the political 
process, will decide whether States can be sued by private citizens 
under Title II of the ADA in contexts other than that of access to the 
courts. Similarly, the courts, not the people or their representatives, 
will decide the sensitive, complex legal questions implicated in the 
Cheney case.264 
Newdow illustrates another mismatch between the means of 
judicial minimalism and the end of democracy promotion. One cost of 
minimalist decisions is that they do not attract the same level of public 
attention as do sweeping judicial rulings, and therefore do not prompt 
the same type of vigorous public response. Had the Supreme Court in 
Newdow declared unconstitutional voluntary public-school Pledge-
recitation policies, the issue of future judicial appointments would 
have played a far larger role in the 2004 Presidential election than it in 
fact did.265 
To be sure, none of these examples compels the conclusion that 
the practice of judicial minimalism will never serve to enhance the 
quality of democratic deliberation in American society. But they do 
suggest how attenuated the link is between the practice of minimalism 
and the democratic values motivating Professor Sunstein’s project. 
C. Overlapping Consensus: Why and How? 
The political philosophy of John Rawls stresses the challenge of 
negotiating successfully the reasonable yet irreconcilable 
disagreements regarding basic questions of religion, morality, and 
philosophy that characterize modern, heterogeneous, democratic 
societies.266 Rawls asks how such a pluralistic society can achieve social 
unity in the context of a just society, constituted by free and equal 
 
263. See supra notes 135-141, 240-243 and accompanying text. 
264. See supra notes 197-207, 244 and accompanying text. 
265. On judicial appointments and the election, see, for example, Neil S. Siegel, The 
election and the U.S. Supreme Court, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 2, 2004, § 1, at 21, which states: 
It is unfortunate that a sitting justice’s illness should be necessary to focus the public’s 
attention on the critical legal questions that hang in the balance. But that is where we are. 
Voters should ask what kind of Supreme Court they want for the next few decades before 
casting their ballots. 
266. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
SIEGEL 5.DOC 7/11/2005 8:17 AM 
2012 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:1951 
 
citizens, and governed through democratic institutions. His answer is 
an overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice.267 “Such 
a consensus,” he writes, “consists of all the reasonable opposing 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines likely to persist over 
generations and to gain a sizable body of adherents in a more or less 
just constitutional regime, a regime in which the criterion of justice is 
that political conception itself.”268 
Inspired by Rawls’ theorizing about justice, Professor Sunstein 
seeks to apply Rawlsian political philosophy to constitutional 
decisionmaking: 
[A] minimalist court attempts to achieve a great goal of [a 
heterogeneous] society: making agreement possible when agreement is 
necessary, and making agreement unnecessary when agreement is 
impossible. This goal is associated both with promoting social stability 
and with achieving a form of mutual respect.269 
Professor Sunstein’s assumptions and conclusions are suspect. For one 
thing, this defense of minimalism assumes that “promoting social 
stability” and “achieving a form of mutual respect” can be more 
important than protecting fundamental constitutional rights. More 
concretely, considerations of social stability support the proposition 
that the Court should not have decided Brown v. Board of 
Education.270 It was not obvious to many Americans in the 1950s that 
de jure segregation was unreasonable, let alone a moral and 
constitutional outrage. Indeed, parts of the country were polarized 
over the issue, and the Court came close to losing its bet with 
constitutional destiny as massive resistance in Southern states 
threatened outright repudiation of the Brown decision.271 
Nor is it evident that minimalist judicial decisions actually will tend 
to achieve the goal of stabilizing society and promoting mutual 
respect. One possible approach to this vexing problem would be to 
suggest that the common ground among diverse Justices who sign on 
to minimalist decisions may have the best chance of matching the 
overlapping consensus in American society. Yet this line of thinking is 
subject to the critique previously articulated at the end of Part I: 
minimalism requires a story connecting the ideological and 
methodological views of the Justices to divergences in the population 
at large. Otherwise, compromising on principle to get along with one’s 
colleagues has little to do with the democratic values minimalism 
seeks to promote. Pre-empirically and as a general matter, it seems 
 
267. See id. at 15. 
268. Id. 
269. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 50. 
270. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
271. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 694 (2d ed. 2005). 
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just as likely that narrow and shallow Supreme Court rulings will 
extend the agony by stringing the country along with unclear decisions 
as social conflicts continue to fester — until the Court finally steps in 
and provides real guidance. 
D. Theory’s Unavoidability 
As explored earlier,272 there is much to be said for Professor 
Sunstein’s recognition that the theoretical ambition of contemporary 
constitutional theory renders the field somewhat out of touch with the 
practice of constitutional adjudication. He goes too far in the other 
direction, however, in suggesting that judicial minimalists can sidestep 
basic questions about “the legitimate role of the Supreme Court in the 
constitutional order.”273 This is a critical point. Minimalists cannot 
avoid constitutional theory because minimalism cannot identify when 
minimalism should be employed. Rather, minimalism itself 
presupposes an antecedent, broader theoretical enterprise, one of 
whose purposes is to evaluate whether and when a narrow and shallow 
approach makes sense. The basic aim of this nonminimalist theoretical 
endeavor is to distinguish questions that are for the political process 
from those that are for the courts. Professor Sunstein implicitly, if 
unwittingly, concedes this point in stating that most of the Justices 
“embrace minimalism — usually, not always — for reasons connected 
with their conception of the role of the Supreme Court in American 
government.”274 
Indeed, Professor Sunstein himself participates in this broader 
theoretical enterprise in at least two ways. First, he chooses to focus 
on the avoidance of decision and error costs and the promotion of 
democratic deliberation and overlapping consensus as constitutional 
values that judicial decisionmaking should advance. Second, he 
sketches when a narrow and shallow approach makes sense from the 
standpoint of best advancing those values.275 He therefore stresses that 
 
272. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text (critiquing the turn to high theory in 
academic constitutional law). 
273. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 8. 
274. Id. at 9. It might be suggested in response that Professor Sunstein’s theory makes 
room for broad Hamdi-type decisions — that it allows for the exceptional movement to 
grand theory. Indeed, minimalism might be justified in part because it not only allows for the 
special, grand case but also gives special import and majesty to such a case. To be sure, 
Professor Sunstein would agree that there is some place, however limited, for breadth and 
depth on the Supreme Court. But the point remains that in order to create such space, he 
must step outside his theory of judicial minimalism; the theory itself does not provide any 
room. 
275. Id. at 46-60 (identifying, inter alia, the problems with judicial minimalism in certain 
settings, and recommending when minimalism, as opposed to maximalism, should be 
employed). 
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“the choice between minimalism and the alternatives depends partly 
on pragmatic considerations and partly on judgments about the 
capacities of various institutional actors.”276 He further submits that a 
minimalist approach is not advisable when “the interest at stake ought 
to be judged off-limits to politics,”277 but that in other situations 
“democracy-promoting forms of minimalism, designed to promote 
both accountability and reason-giving, are appropriate and salutary 
judicial functions; they promote constitutional ideals without risking 
excessive judicial intervention into political domains.”278 
The theory of judicial minimalism, therefore, does not alter the 
important lesson, instantiated in decisions such as Brown and Hamdi, 
for which modern constitutional theory must account: leaving 
questions to the majoritarian political process is not an inherent good 
in a democratic society. Rather, a constitutional democracy should be 
guided by a persuasive account of which issues are for the political 
process and which are for the courts. Constitutional theory will prove 
useful in this regard only to the extent it makes sense of the actual 
practice of constitutional adjudication and helps that practice to fulfill 
its deepest aspirations by clarifying the judiciary’s appropriate role in 
the American system of government. 
To meet that challenge, an attractive constitutional theory must 
transcend a narrow and shallow approach to constitutional 
decisionmaking. Judicial minimalism can provide no guidance 
concerning the foundational questions of constitutional theory: 
clarifying whether and when the Supreme Court should stay its hand, 
when the Justices should intervene in the political process to a limited 
extent, and when the Court should step up and expound robustly the 
fundamental law of the Constitution. Rich jurisprudential traditions 
are associated with each of those postures. They include the judicial-
restraint school of Justice Frankfurter and Professors Bickel and 
 
276. Id. at 56. Specifically, Professor Sunstein argues: 
[I]t is worthwhile to attempt a broad and deep solution (1) when judges have considerable 
confidence in the merits of that solution, (2) when the solution can reduce costly uncertainty 
for future courts and litigants, (3) when advance planning is important, and (4) when a 
maximalist approach will promote democratic goals either by creating the preconditions for 
democracy or by imposing good incentives on elected officials, incentives to which they are 
likely to be responsive. Minimalism becomes more attractive (1) when judges are proceeding 
in the midst of (constitutionally relevant) factual or moral uncertainty and rapidly changing 
circumstances, (2) when any solution seems likely to be confounded by future cases, 
(3) when the need for advance planning does not seem insistent, and (4) when the 
preconditions for democratic self-government are not at stake and democratic goals are not 
likely to be promoted by a rule-bound judgment. 
Id. at 57. 
277. Id. at 56. 
278. Id. at 28. See also id. at 26 (distinguishing among “democracy-promoting, 
democracy-foreclosing, and democracy-permitting outcomes”). 
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Ely,279 the heroic tradition of Brown, and — one should not forget — 
the negative heroic tradition of Korematsu and Dred Scott v. 
Sandford.280 Inductively, through close study of actual constitutional 
cases, modern constitutional theory can help the bench and bar to sort 
out when and why the Justices should assume one judicial role rather 
than another. The suggestion that one of those judicial postures does 
and should dominate misses a lot of what is — and ought to be — 
going on inside a sophisticated institution in our democracy and 
throughout much of our history. 
Narrow and shallow decisions, in other words, constitute just one 
potential tool. And if all legal scholars have is a hammer, they will err 
in perceiving every problem as a nail. If Justices make the same 
mistake, the consequences can be unfortunate, even tragic. 
E. The Court as Guardian 
Implicit throughout the above assessment of judicial minimalism’s 
normative attractiveness is this insistent demand of our constitutional 
culture: often the Justices have a duty to resolve important 
constitutional questions, especially those implicating the fundamental 
rights of individuals.281 This obligation is more important than the rule-
of-law values of stability, consistency, predictability, and (I would add) 
sincerity implicated in Blakely and Newdow. For example, the 
outcome in Hamdi underscores that minimalism writ large would 
eviscerate an essential part of the Supreme Court’s role — and 
comparative advantage — in our constitutional system of separate but 
interrelated powers. Relative to the President, Congress, and the 
states, the Justices are more insulated from the pressures of 
majoritarian politics and therefore better equipped to protect minority 
rights.282 Accordingly, there are times when the Court should step up 
to the plate and insist that the Constitution’s protections be vindicated 
 
279. See generally BICKEL, supra note 12; ELY, supra note 24. 
280. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
281. Cf. Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between 
Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1838 (2004) (“A core value 
of the neutral-principles tradition that has been lacking from minimalist theory is its 
affirmative, as opposed to just negative, defense of judicial power. Rather than just 
defending judicial power on the ground that it is not so bad, the neutral-principles tradition 
affirmatively embraced judicial power as a mechanism to enforce the rule of law.”). 
282. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 12, at 25-26 (“Judges have, or should have, the leisure, 
the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of 
government.”); STONE, supra note 214, at 543 (“The comparative advantages of courts over 
the executive and legislative branches in interpreting and enforcing constitutional rights are 
striking. Responsiveness to the electorate is essential to the day-to-day workings of 
democracy, but as the framers of the Constitution well understood, that responsiveness can 
also lead elected officials too readily to sacrifice the rights of a despised or feared 
minority.”). 
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robustly, not narrowly and shallowly. The Court’s decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education came close to realizing that aspiration,283 and 
Hamdi is no minimalist tract. As the executive branch pressed the 
claim that the President possesses inherent authority as Commander 
in Chief to designate an American citizen an enemy combatant and to 
detain him indefinitely without access to counsel even absent 
congressional authorization, the Congress did nothing.284 Congress still 
has done nothing. Not so the Court. 
Minimalism’s promise, therefore, does not lie in providing a 
template for how the Justices should decide most or all cases before 
the Court. The potential payoff, rather, resides in prescribing targeted 
interventions in a limited number of cases. Those cases do not include 
the Blakelys and Hamdis of the docket, where it is altogether 
appropriate for the Justices to vindicate basic rule-of-law and 
constitutional values. Rather, minimalism may be appropriate in cases 
raising questions concerning which, as Professor Sunstein has 
developed persuasively,285 there exists profound moral disagreement 
within American society; the Court has good reason not to be 
confident that it knows (or would be wise to impose on the country at 
a certain time) the appropriate resolution; and the citizenry, in 
grappling with the question, might profit from — and actually engage 
in — further democratic debate and reflection. 
Of course, it can be extraordinarily difficult to discern whether a 
situation calls for maximalism, minimalism, or something in between. 
And while it is a primary task of constitutional theory to provide 
guidance on this question, no decision rules are available; resolutions 
ultimately turn on such considerations as those discussed immediately 
above, as well as careful exercises of the human faculty of judgment. 
The answers that are formulated, moreover, inevitably will be 
contestable and contested. Leaders within the gay-rights movement in 
this country, for example, are currently debating among themselves 
whether it would make sense to ease off of litigating the marriage 
issue for now and push harder for civil unions — the animating 
 
283. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Some commentators have argued that Brown was not decided 
as broadly and (especially) as deeply as the conventional wisdom would have it. See, e.g., 
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 37-39; Rosen, supra note 48, at 44-45. For 
example, a lack of depth may in part account for why the Warren Court’s decisions were 
ambiguous as applied to the issue of affirmative action. Indeed, it would not be unfair to 
suggest that the discussion of Brown in this Article draws not only from what the Court in 
Brown actually said, but also from what the decision has come to represent. Even restricting 
oneself to the opinion itself, however, Brown is far from minimalist. 
284. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2004) (“The Government maintains 
that no explicit authorization is required, because the Executive possesses plenary authority 
to detain pursuant to Article II of the Constitution.”); Brief for the Respondents at 13-18, 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696) (making this argument). 
285. See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9, at 54-60 (articulating the view 
expressed in the text). 
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concern being that the movements’s legal goals may be years ahead of 
its political and cultural strategy.286 
Such difficulties of discernment notwithstanding, prescription in 
select situations constitutes the defining theme of the legal tradition 
from which Professor Sunstein draws much inspiration. Naim v. 
Naim,287 to cite an historic example whose extraordinary circumstances 
underscore the point, was not understood by Justice Frankfurter or 
Professor Bickel to exemplify how the Court should go about its daily 
business.288 Rather, it constituted a rare accommodation that principle 
made with pragmatism for the ultimate purpose of vindicating 
Brown’s promise. Principle lost the battle for a few more years,289 a 
significant — and perhaps intolerable — cost, but at least principle put 
itself in a position not to lose the war. In other circumstances, 
however, leaving more questions to the political process clearly will 
not be advisable. In Brown itself, the minimalist option would have 
been for the Court to hold that racially segregated schools violated 
equal protection because they were funded unequally. The 
contemporary constitutional culture in the United States would reject 
as indefensible any constitutional theory endorsing that hypothetical 
outcome in Brown as preferable to the Court’s actual holding.290 
Similarly, it is difficult to see how the country or the Court would have 
been better served by a narrower and shallower decision in Hamdi. 
 
286. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Groups Debate Slower Strategy on Gay Rights, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at A1 (“Leaders of the gay rights movement are embroiled in a bitter 
and increasingly public debate over whether they should moderate their goals in the wake of 
bruising losses in November when 11 states approved constitutional amendments prohibiting 
same-sex marriages.”); Adam Liptak, Caution in Court for Gay Rights Groups, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 12, 2004, at A16 (“Fearful that aggressive action could backfire and generate public 
hostility, gay rights groups are planning to limit the scope of their legal challenges to the 
constitutional amendments banning gay marriage that were passed by 11 states last week. 
The groups are making a temporary retreat from their most fundamental goal, winning the 
right for same-sex marriages, and focusing instead on those measures that addressed civil 
unions in some way.”). 
287. 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (refusing to hear a challenge to Virginia’s antimiscegenation 
statute). 
288. See BICKEL, supra note 12, at 174 (providing the classic defense of the Court’s 
action); Neal Devins, The Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1981 
(1999) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 9) (discussing the issue and 
quoting a November 4, 1955 memorandum by Justice Frankfurter to the Conference). 
289. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (unanimously striking down Virginia’s 
antimiscegenation statute as a violation of equal protection and due process). 
290. To be sure, Brown had its share of legal critics in the years after it came down. See, 
e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 31-34 (1959) (using his notion of “neutral principles” to criticize Brown). But time has so 
secured the decision’s legitimacy in the American popular and constitutional culture that not 
even a self-described staunch originalist like Justice Scalia is prepared to repudiate that most 
nonoriginalist decision. See Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confidence: The Jurisprudence of 
Justice Antonin Scalia, THE NEW YORKER, March 28, 2005, at 54 (“Though Scalia says that 
he would have voted with the majority in Brown, it’s hard to see an originalist justification 
for it.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
To the extent the theory of judicial minimalism aspires to be a 
descriptively accurate account of the Court’s work, it requires a 
relatively crisp operational definition that can be falsified. But the 
only such definition reasonably available undercuts minimalism’s 
normative aspirations. It is doubtful that, understood according to its 
operational criterion, the theory will generate the normative benefits 
Professor Sunstein identifies. Accordingly, minimalism must either 
give up its claims to falsifiability or significantly temper its assertion of 
prescriptive appeal. 
Moreover, insofar as the foregoing analysis of the October 2003 
Term is illustrative of a larger reality, the falsifiable variant of 
minimalism is, in fact, descriptively false as a general matter. This 
Article has taken seriously the only operational definition of 
minimalism discernable in Professor Sunstein’s writings, applied that 
definition rigorously, and shown that it fails generally to account for 
the Justices’ decisionmaking during an important, recent Term. 
Minimalism, in short, cannot have it all. But can it have 
something? Most likely, it can. If the version of minimalism that is 
empirically testable is neither descriptively valid nor normatively 
attractive, then Professor Sunstein’s work can be rehabilitated in at 
least two ways. First, minimalism could replace its provocative 
descriptive assertion that the Court typically decides cases “as 
narrowly and shallowly as possible” with the more modest — but less 
clearly inaccurate — suggestion that a majority of the Justices 
(whether considered individually or collectively) tend to favor 
relatively narrow and shallow holdings; that is, they tend to forego 
broader and deeper alternatives in deciding cases, even if they do not 
go so far as to adopt the narrowest and shallowest rationale 
reasonably available. That claim, although more difficult to test than 
Professor Sunstein’s more aggressive description contention,291 could 
nonetheless then be subjected to empirical testing. 
Alternatively, judicial minimalism could abandon Professor 
Sunstein’s claims of descriptive accuracy and reinterpret itself to be an 
entirely normative theory designed to serve certain substantive ends. 
Reformulated in this fashion, however, it is not clear what the thrust 
of the theory is. If the point is to conserve judicial legitimacy, how 
exactly is it distinct from, and similar to, Professor Bickel’s 
foundational work on the passive virtues?292 If the purpose, rather, is 
to promote democratic deliberation, what can courts do, beyond what 
 
291. See supra note 48. 
292. See supra note 12. 
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Professor Ely has identified,293 meaningfully to advance that cause? If 
the goal is instead overlapping consensus, how does Professor 
Sunstein offer a legal theory at all? Finally, if the end of judicial 
minimalism is to advance all those values and perhaps others as well, 
how do they trade off when they conflict in a given case? In short, 
minimalism can be saved as a normative account, but then it seems 
underdeveloped at this point. Moreover, Professor Sunstein’s 
emphasis on narrowness and shallowness is somewhat misplaced 
because a normative theory will call for breadth and depth whenever 
necessary to serve the values that the theory is supposed to advance.  
My own judgment is that minimalism would be employed most 
usefully to counsel close consideration — at the opinion-writing phase 
in select situations — of the powerful lessons of prudence, caution, 
and restraint that are present in Professor Sunstein’s work. As 
indicated above,294 such a move would bring the theory of judicial 
minimalism closer to the grand Bickelian tradition into which 
Professor Sunstein has breathed new life. 
 
 
293. See supra note 24. 
294. See supra text accompanying notes 285-290 (arguing that minimalism possesses 
greater power to prescribe in select situations than to describe the Supreme Court’s general 
behavior). 
